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ABSTRACT 
A universal system of criminal procedure offers the allure of efficiency, predictability, 
and enhanced crime control.  For the first time in modern history, universality seems achievable.  
The criminal procedures employed by the world‟s major legal systems are converging.  What 
was once distinctively “civil” or “common law” is now a blend of the two.  The adversarial 
adjudicative approach of most common law countries now can be found in the most unlikely 
places, and civil law characteristics adorn the processes of some of the world‟s most aggressively 
adversarial systems.   
While this movement has not gone unnoticed, the pace of change has accelerated, and the 
ways in which it has manifested itself have increased.  This article begins by revealing how little 
systems actually differ in practice.  It then analyzes how the gap that remains between these 
systems is closing by examining three illustrations of convergence: the growing use of lay judges 
and juries in civil law countries, the Italian reform movement incorporating adversarial 
techniques in a traditionally nonadversarial system, and the modernization of Chinese criminal 
procedure. 
Following or perhaps leading this trend are a new breed of “hybrid” legal systems that 
borrow freely from several legal traditions and invent procedures freely.  Beginning with the 
creation of multinational and supranational criminal tribunals following the end of World War II, 
new institutions and processes have been developed to deal with regional and international 
violations.  Among the most important examples of the movement toward hybridization and 
multinational adjudication is the Corpus Juris project.  Little known in the United States, this 
proposal represents a controversial effort within the European Union to harmonize – and perhaps 
to universalize – the criminal processes related to protecting the Community‟s financial interests.  
Only some of the recommendations resulting from Corpus Juris have been instituted, but it  
nevertheless continues to  impact  thinking about unification and reform.  Several tribunals 
already function with regional and international jurisdiction.  The European Court of Human 
Rights, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the International 
Criminal Court have somewhat distinctive rules of procedure, but all blend the traditions of the 
major legal systems in a slightly different mix. 
Will the trend toward adversarial trials and hybrid rules of adjudication eventually 
produce, as some have predicted, a universal system?  This article explains not only the 
influences propelling countries toward a similar view of criminal procedure, but also why that 
movement is inherently limited and unlikely to produce universality. 
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INNOVATION OR RENOVATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: IS THE 
WORLD MOVING TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF ADJUDICATION? 
by Gerald S. Reamey
1
I. Introduction 
Comparativists for some time have noted that the world‟s major legal systems, at least in 
their broadest characteristics, are becoming less distinctive.
2
  Casual students of comparative law
1
Professor of Law and Co-Director of International Legal Programs, St. Mary‟s 
University School of Law. I was assisted in researching this article by St. Mary‟s law students 
Cassandra Charles, Andrew Skemp, Pim Skulkaew, Matthew Ort, and Megan Schad. Very 
helpful comments, contributions and critiques were provided by my St. Mary‟s colleagues 
Michael Ariens, Dorie Klein, and Gary Liu, and by my favorite lawyer, Kay Reamey.  This 
work, and my interest in this field, was inspired by many conversations with my very good friend 
and sometime co-teacher, Professor Frank Hoepfel of the University of Vienna.  His comments 
on drafts of the article provided the perspective of an academic schooled in a different legal 
tradition that every comparative work needs. While I am truly grateful for the essential help I 
received from each of these talented people, they share none of the responsibility for the views I 
express. 
2
See, e.g., RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, MIRJAN R. DAMASKA 
& PETER E. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW 31 (5
th
 ed. 1988) (“At the beginning of this
century, perhaps as a reaction against excessive nationalism, there arose a strong movement 
favoring massive comparative studies and postulating, as the ultimate aim of such studies, the 
3 
may continue to describe these systems by reference to their degrees of adversariness, or to the 
presence or absence of procedural features, or perhaps to their differing views of sources of law.
3
But increasingly, the reality is much more difficult to confine within the traditional parameters.
4
total or at least substantial unification of all civilized legal systems.”); DAVID LUBAN, JULIE 
R. O‟SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 136 (2010) (there “is a clear trend toward harmonization, if not actual 
convergence, among the various legal systems around the world ....traditional boundaries 
between different legal “systems” or “traditions” are eroding”); Vincenzo Ferrari, LAW AND 
SOCIETY STUDIES AND LEGAL EDUCATION, 55 J. Legal Educ. 495, 498-99 (“the status 
of today's law, … displays …  a growing degree of interdependence and convergence among all 
the world's legal systems”). 
3
See generally, RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, MIRJAN R. 
DAMASKA & PETER E. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE LAW 229-525 (5
th
 ed. 1988)
(comparing common law and civil law methods and sources); MARY ANN GLENDON, 
MICHAEL W. GORDON & PAOLO G. CAROZZA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 
IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1999) (comparing “civil law traditions” and “common law 
traditions”); Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization 
of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1, 
7-26 (2004) (discussing different approaches to the adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems). 
4This confusion is reflected in Professor Pizzi‟s difficulty defining the difference in 
American and Continental European trial systems: 
  4 
 It is not entirely clear, for instance, why criminal procedures in European courts seem to 
be growing more similar to those in the United States.  At the same time, Mexican criminal trials 
look very different from ones in Germany or Italy, even though those countries share a common 
legal heritage with Mexico.  Perhaps the explanation lies in the increasing access to information, 
a variation on the “world is shrinking” view that people previously separated by geography, 
culture, and cumbersome communication will affect each other more rapidly as they have more 
contacts.  Or, it may be that new political and - more importantly - economic and trade alliances 
are pushing societies to “harmonize” in the interest of efficiency and productivity.5  Whatever 
                                                                                                                                                             
When some respected judge or trial attorney gives a lecture at my law school and 
announces with fervor that “ours is an adversary system,” confident that he or she has 
expressed some obvious and basic truth about our American legal system, I nod in 
agreement like the rest of the audience.  But deep down I do not understand the 
distinction being drawn and what is supposed to separate the American trial system, and 
presumably the English system, from other western trial systems.  The world that seems 
black and white to others seems to be only gradations of gray to me: some dark, some 
light, but all shades of gray. 
William T. Pizzi, The American Adversary System, 100 W. Va. L. Rev. 847 (1998).  
5
See Emma Phillips, THE WAR ON CIVIL LAW? THE COMMON LAW AS A 
PROXY FOR THE GLOBAL AMBITION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 24 Wis. Int'l L.J. 
915, 917 (2007) (“... the contest between civil law and common law can be seen as a proxy for 
an ideologically informed debate about the purpose of law in state formation, the flow of capital, 
  5 
the explanations, it is at least demonstrable that in important ways, and at a rate well in excess of 
the usual pace of evolution in law, the understanding of what defines a “legal system” is 
changing.
6
 
 “Convergence” is the word often used to describe this change, and indeed, there has been 
a noticeable tendency in reform efforts to look outside the traditional processes of one‟s own 
legal system and incorporate features borrowed from other forms.
7
  This has resulted in “civil 
law” countries adopting certain “commonlaw” procedures, and “commonlaw” countries 
departing from the methods usually associated with the common law system.  As examples 
accumulate of nations moving toward a common, hybridized view of criminal procedure, it is 
important to investigate some of the reasons for this reform – which sometimes is quite radical - 
and to consider the ways in which these reforms are being applied. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and the regulation of markets”).  For an example of an effort to harmonize a body of law within 
the European Union, see Bernhard A. Koch, The “European Group on Tort Law” and Its 
“Principles of European Tort Law,” 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 189 (2005). 
6
See Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law 
Jurisdiction, 41 Vand. J. Transnat‟l L. 1083, 1094 (2008) (classical characteristics of legal 
systems are fading or spreading). 
7
See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O‟SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 136 (2010) (there “is a clear 
trend toward harmonization, if not actual convergence, among the various legal systems around 
the world”). 
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 In this article I describe first what people know, or think they know, about the traditional 
order
8
 before demonstrating that for a long time the differences in the criminal procedures of the 
major legal systems have not been as great as commonly believed.
9
  Next, I explore a few 
significant ways in which the gap between the systems has been narrowing in recent years.  To 
do this, I consider the increasing use of juries and lay judges in places where lay participation 
either has never existed, or has not existed for a long time.
10
  I then review the extraordinary 
reform efforts in Italy, breaking with its historical approach to criminal justice and moving 
deliberately toward a “middle-ground.”11  Finally, I describe the movement in China away from 
an entirely different kind of legal system to one that - at least in principle - is imbued with 
modern aspects borrowed from several procedural schemes.
12
 
 While these changes have been occurring, legal systems have been developing at the 
supranational level.  In both regional and international tribunals established for special purposes, 
whole legal regimes have been created, without traditions of their own, but borrowing liberally in 
smorgasbord fashion from others.
13
  These examples - the European Court of Human Rights, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court 
- play an important role in leading or reflecting the hybridization of criminal procedure.
14
  In this 
                                                 
8
 See infra Part II. 
9
 See infra Part III. 
10
 See infra Part IV.A. 
11
 See infra Part IV.B. 
12
 See infra Part IV.C.  
13
 See infra Part V. 
14
See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O‟SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 137 (2010) (decisions by 
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regard, I also review the impact of the European Union‟s Corpus Juris project - a possible 
precursor to a unified system of criminal procedure for an entire continent of diverse and 
sovereign nations. 
 Against this backdrop, I discuss why I think these changes are occurring and what the 
prospects are that they will continue and result in adoption of a universal “third-way” of 
adjudicating criminal cases.  Is this convergence the result of a deliberate attempt to harmonize 
and homogenize systems?  Is it a common recognition of a better way to achieve criminal 
justice?  Or is this “trend” really only a fad or coincidence?  The answers to these questions lie 
not only in law, but in an understanding of common values, geopolitics, cultural change, the 
impact of world markets, and the information revolution. 
II. The Principal Legal Traditions as They are Commonly Understood and 
Misunderstood 
 In order to grasp the magnitude and reach of these movements toward convergence and to 
speculate about the causes for them, I will revisit the most common characterizations of these 
systems.  The world‟s major legal systems15 traditionally are divided into three: those in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
regional human rights tribunals “push states in the direction of procedural fairness and 
recognition of defendants‟ rights”). 
15The use of “major” to describe these systems is entirely my own.  Others systems, 
important in their own right and often of growing prominence, may deserve a place that I have 
not reserved for them in this article.  For example, the importance of Islamic law deserves 
attention, but I have chosen not to incorporate “religion-based” legal systems within this analysis 
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“common-law” tradition; others (most) in the “civil-law” tradition; and a smaller, but significant 
group in the “communist/socialist” tradition.16  As noted, significant differences exist within 
each of these categories.
17
  The English practice common law in a way that is quite distinct from 
                                                                                                                                                             
because their nature does not allow the same kind of change that secular systems do.  Over time, 
significant modifications may occur in these systems, but they do not provide a good barometer 
for worldwide change due to the tenets upon which they are founded. 
16
See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O‟SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 135 (2010) (“main 
distinction” is between common law tradition and civil law tradition but socialist law tradition 
also could be identified); Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil 
Law Jurisdiction, 41 Vand. J. Transnat‟l L. 1083, 1095 (2008) (common law and civil law 
systems are in “Western” tradition; others are in the “Eastern”); William Parlett, Re-Classifying 
Russian Law: Mechanisms, Outcomes, and Solutions for an Overly Politicized Field, 2 Colum. 
J.E. Eur. L. 1, 24. As Partlett notes, some comparativists have “written off” communist and 
socialist systems as insignificant or extinct. Id. at 39-41. As I write this, I can imagine many 
legal comparativists cringing at my use of any of these outdated descriptions.  I have used the 
terms precisely because they remain so firmly associated with a body of notions about differing 
processes of adjudication that, for my purposes in this article, they serve as a ready shorthand for 
a cumbersome conglomeration of fact and fiction. 
17
See id. at 136 (many legal systems do not fit neatly into categories). 
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the version we use in the United States.
18
  Among the civil law countries, some nations employ 
variations that would be barely recognizable to others in the same tradition.  Not so long ago, 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was the leading exemplar of a communist approach 
to justice.  Now, like Russia, it has adopted a changing legal system with vestiges of the past and 
sometimes awkward reform features of the future. 
 If these differences are set aside and the “major systems” are categorized by those who 
have little interest in, and exposure to, the detailed workings of those systems, the stereotypical 
characterizations might look like this: Those of us who follow the common law tradition see the 
decisions of courts, especially higher appellate courts, as a legitimate source of law.  While we 
also recognize the legislative branch of government as a creator of law, and while we might even 
consider statutes and constitutions to control over “judge-made” law, in the absence of such 
conflict, the rules crafted by courts are seen as binding, not just on lower courts, but on society as 
a whole.   
 The English-influenced varieties of common law also share another distinguishing 
characteristic.  They all are, to varying degrees, “adversarial” in their adjudicatory processes.  As 
                                                 
18
See John Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in England and Wales, COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 180 (J. Hatcher, B. Huber & R. Vogler eds. 1996) (law in England 
and Wales has evolved in ways unlike “many former British colonies”). I am reminded in this 
regard of Professor Henry Higgins‟s lyric in “My Fair Lady” to the effect that English hasn‟t 
been spoken in America for years.  Just as we are two peoples divided by a common language, 
our legal systems bear similarities, but with distinctive accents. 
  10 
has been discussed extensively by many capable comparativists, this feature relegates the 
common law trial judge to the role of neutral referee,
19
 rather than an active participant in the 
gathering of evidence and its presentation at trial.
20
  The lawyers (advocates) shape and control 
the investigation, accusation, trial, and appeal of the case. 
 By contrast, the stereotypical civil law system supposedly pays little or no attention to the 
decisions of appellate judges in deciding what the law “is.”  Law is made by the legislature or the 
                                                 
19
See CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 217-18 (2001) (role of judge in adversary system in comparison with that of the 
“umpire” in sports contest); Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial 
Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1009, 1017-18 (1974) (comparing the 
roles of lawyers and judges in adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings); Raja Devasish Roy, 
Challenges for Juridical Pluralism and Customary Laws of Indigenous Peoples: The Case of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, 21 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 113, 131 n. 40 (“A typical, if 
somewhat oversimplified, example of an "adversarial" system of justice is the English Common 
Law system where traditional theories of jurisprudence regard the duties of the judge not to 
"inquire into the truth" - as is done in an "inquisitorial" system of justice - but to act as a neutral 
umpire in an "adversarial" contest between two active parties”). 
20
Of course, the degree to which the judge is detached or an active participant differs 
from country to country and judge to judge.  The relative inactivity of the trial judge nevertheless 
remains a common feature of adversarial systems, and is usually associated with common law 
origins. 
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executive; judges read and apply the law, and perhaps occasionally interpret the law, but only 
within very limited bounds.  What the judges have to say about the application of the law is of 
importance only to the parties; it is of scant concern to other courts within the same system, and 
holds no formal precedential value. 
 In adjudication, the civil law judges - usually professionally trained, but sometimes 
sitting collegially with lay colleagues - control the trial.
21
  Often, magistrates also play a role in 
the investigation phase, and may even have extensive supervisory powers over it.
22
  Prosecutors 
in these systems tend to be relegated to more preliminary tasks, and may have relatively little 
discretionary authority.
23
  It is not unusual to find prosecutors and judges functioning within the 
same branch of government, in cooperation, and perhaps as interchangeable career professionals 
who have never ventured outside this professional track to serve in other capacities. 
 Communist legal systems share many of the procedural features of civil law systems.
24
  
                                                 
21
See CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 217 (2001) (The Continental judge is the “head of the procedure,” the “most 
prominent figure,” “the inquisitor”). 
22
See Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in 
American Criminal Procedure, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1009, 1018-19 (1974) (investigating magistrate 
gathers evidence and assembles the dossier for the court). 
23
See id. at 1019 (little or no discretion lies with the prosecutor). 
24
See John C. Reitz,, Doubts About Convergence: Political Economy as an Impediment to 
Globalization, 12 Transnat‟l L. & Contemp. Probs. 139, 156 (2002) (Russian law more strongly 
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The overt political control exercised by the state over the criminal justice system distinguishes 
this kind of legal system from others using the civil law form.
25
  Judicial independence may be 
lacking entirely,
26
 or may be compromised heavily by the perceived needs of the state in service 
to the ideological ends it pursues.  Seeing the judiciary, and indeed the entire criminal justice 
mechanism, as an arm of state policy results in processes that usually are detached in practice 
from the expressed principles embodied in the laws of the nation.  For example, lay assessors 
sometimes play a prominent role in criminal trials - a visible acknowledgment of the people‟s 
relationship to the state
27
 - although the assessors actually have little or no real independence.  
Higher courts often have expansive power to “correct” lower court findings seen as not being in 
the interest of the state.  Lawyers within the system may see their role, not as protectors of the 
accused, but as partners in the state‟s justice apparatus.  And lawmakers, usually members of one 
dominant political party, can be expected to cooperate with the ruling political elite.
28
   
                                                                                                                                                             
influenced by Continental civil law than by American-based common law). 
25
See Ira Belkin, China, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 92 (C. 
Bradley 2d ed. 2007) (“Chinese judicial system is embedded in a political system that does not 
tolerate challenges to the authority of the Chinese Communist Party .... courts are not 
independent”). 
26
See id. 
27
See id. at 104 (“people assessor” system “developed during Maoist era as a way to bring 
justice closer to the common people”) 
28
Although these features usually do exist within an ideologically motivated legal system, 
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 As the leading practitioners of communism have trended toward market economies and 
trading alliances with non-communist governments and capitalist states, hybrid forms of law and 
procedure have developed to facilitate their economic needs.
29
  Since this is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, hybrid legal systems have developed with features inconsistent with the 
stereotypical model, even while they retain characteristics rooted in the more “pure” communist 
ideology of the past.
30
  This, of course, provides comparativists a virtual laboratory in which 
these experiments may be observed.  In some cases these comparativist scholars are themselves 
called upon to help governments shape their systems to meet new needs.
31
 
                                                                                                                                                             
they also may be prevalent in states with autocratic forms of government or totalitarian regimes.   
29
See Wendy N. Duong, Ghetto'ing Workers with Hi-tech: Exploring Regulatory 
Solutions for the Effect of Artificial Intelligence on "Third World" Foreign Direct Investment, 22 
Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 63, 132 n. 279 (“Take the most fundamental example: the law of 
contract in Vietnam rests on principles that do not always parallel contract common law as we 
know it in the U.S. Nor is the contract law of Vietnam purely based on a civil-code system like 
many European countries. Vietnamese contract law is somewhat a hybrid creature - somewhere 
between a code of morality, social flexibility and remnants of a communist economic and 
political system”); William Partlett, Re-classifying Russian Law: Mechanisms, Outcomes, and 
Solutions for an Overly Politicized Field, 2 Colum. J. E. Eur. L. 1, 49 (2008) (Russia may be 
developing into “hybrid democracy”). 
30
See id. 
31
See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Originality, 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 147, 151 (2008) 
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 In addition to rather commonly recognized legal traditions, one more kind of “legal 
system” must be added.32  This is the ad hoc development of criminal processes designed and 
adopted by the various international criminal tribunals.
33
  These invented systems, taking their 
cues from the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, employ a mix of features borrowed from 
adversarial and non-adversarial systems,
34
 cobbled together to serve the peculiar requirements of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(comparativist scholars do not merely compare different approaches; they make policy 
recommendations based on comparisons). Consultants may influence change in the direction of 
the systems they represent.  When American lawyers and judges advise emerging democracies, 
for example, they are likely to counsel adoption of procedures with which they are familiar.   
32This “system” can scarcely be called that.  It is more accurately a collection of variants 
and combinations.  See Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law, 13 J. 
Conflict & Security L. 477, 479 (2007) (“The system of international criminal law is relatively 
new and its development has been disjointed as we have had a variety of ad hoc international 
tribunals, the International Criminal Court (ICC), national approaches and a range of hybrid 
tribunals”). 
33
See Patricia M. Wald, International Criminal Courts - A Stormy Adolescence, 46 Va. J. 
Int‟l L. 319, 337-39 (2006) (discussing how hybrid tribunals "represent one powerful model 
through which national and international legal systems are communicating and influencing one 
another"); Colin B. Picker, INTERNATIONAL LAW‟S MIXED HERITAGE: A 
COMMON/CIVIL LAW JURISDICTION, 41 Vand. J. Transnat‟l L. 1083, 1087-88 (2008). 
34
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
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courts with mixed-nationality benches, advocates, and parties, and dealing with crimes defined 
by international law rather than a legislative body.  These, too, test new combinations of old 
processes - and sometimes new processes - in a public forum, arguably one that is detached from 
the overpowering influence of any single state‟s culture, language, politics, or legal tradition. 
III. Things Aren’t What They Seem: Why Legal Systems Are More Alike Than Usually 
Believed 
 A.  Sources of law 
 These generalizations about legal systems are too often inaccurate, misleading, or at the 
least, overstated.
35
  While this criticism is justified, there are other, less-often repeated 
observations that demonstrate how much narrower the gap actually is between supposedly 
distinguishing characteristics. 
 Even the most disengaged American can scarcely avoid hearing public political figures 
                                                                                                                                                             
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 30A Fed. Prac. & Proc. 
Evid. § 6360 (1st ed.) (The Nuremberg tribunal employed a hybrid procedure); Colin B. Picker, 
International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, 41 Vand. J. Transnat‟l 
L. 1083, 1087-88 (2008) (mixed processes of ICTY and ICTR have caused problems, and ICC 
may experience similar difficulties). 
35
See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note ___; Emma Phillips, The War on Civil Law? The Common 
Law as a Proxy for the Global Ambition of Law and Economics, 24 Wis. Int'l L.J. 915, 922 
(2007); Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 Yale 
L.J. 480, 481 (1975). 
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decrying “activist judges” and “legislating from the bench.”36  Those same politicians would 
identify the American legal system as a “common law system” formed in the English tradition. 
The inconsistency of calling, on the one hand, for a very limited role for judges and, on the other 
hand, applying a label that incorporates the view of judges as rule-makers and a legitimate source 
of law, seems to be lost on many observers.  This misunderstanding of the essential nature of 
common law judging does highlight, however, the current view and reflects the diminished role 
that judge-made law is seen to have in the development of law, even within in the United States. 
 Statutes now play a dominant part in law creation.
37
  American judges, often to the 
                                                 
36
See Larry V. Starcher, A Judicial Philosophy: People-Oriented Justice, 111 W. Va. L. 
Rev. 411, 452 (2009) (“After three decades of hearing these arguments, my conclusion is, if you 
agree with my interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision, I am a "strict 
constructionist." If you disagree with my interpretation, I'm an "activist judge" legislating from 
the bench! Take your pick!”); Keenan D. Kmeic, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial 
Activism,” 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1441, 1442-43 (2004) (“In the past few years, politicians and media 
pundits have issued harsh rhetoric condemning so-called "activist judges" for "legislating from 
the bench."). 
37
See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern 
State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw out That Baby, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 309, 358 (2002) (“It 
would be useful and illuminating to develop a body of scholarship that counsels legislators about 
the design and drafting of statutes given the dominant role of statutes in the modern state.  The 
failure of scholars to do so thus far is partially attributable to the juro-centrisim of legal 
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surprise of Europeans, rarely craft entirely new legal doctrine, and probably do not see 
themselves as having that responsibility.
38
  To the extent that American judges “make” law,39 it 
is more likely to involve the interpretation of statutes.  If that interpretation is by a higher 
appellate court, it has precedential effect and binds lower courts within the same jurisdiction.  It 
is in this limited realm that the American “common law” judge “makes” law, and not in the free-
wheeling fashion some may imagine.
40
  
 Even the English judge - the quintessential common law figure - plays a secondary role in 
making law.  The English Parliament is considered the primary law-making body, with judges 
                                                                                                                                                             
scholarship ....”). 
38
See Matthew Weisberg, Hon. John Richard Padova Senior U.S. District Judge, Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, 56-MAY Fed. Law. 26, 27 (“The judge is not inclined to give his 
judicial philosophy a label, matter-of-factly stating that trial judges in most matters do not really 
have the opportunity to "make new law."). 
39
With respect to criminal law, many states in the United States have completely 
abandoned common law crimes, and require that offenses be defined by statute.  See, e.g., TEX. 
PENAL CODE Sec. 1.03(a). 
40
See Jill Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061, 1072 (2000) (“Judge-made law is generally more 
stable and consistent than legislation, which is affected by politics, and that courts are limited in 
the scope of the changes they can effect by the nature of the cases brought before them”). 
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playing a much more restricted part.
41
  Statutes control and expand in influence; judge-made law  
shrinks in importance.  
 But is it not much the same in the civil law?  In a legal regime in which codes, and only 
codes, are considered to be law,
42
 do the decisions of courts have no force?  Actually, they do 
have considerable importance.  Obviously, the parties to the litigation are affected by these 
rulings.  From their perspective, the trial judge who interprets a code, even incorrectly, has made 
                                                 
41
See Abbott v. Reg., [1977] A.C. 755, 767 (“Judges have no power to create new 
criminal offences; nor in their Lordships‟ opinion for the reasons already stated, have they the 
power to invent a new defence to murder which is entirely contrary to fundamental legal doctrine 
accepted for hundreds of years without question.  If a policy change of such a fundamental 
nature were to be made it could, in their Lordships‟ view, be made only by Parliament.  Whilst 
their Lordships‟ strongly uphold the right and indeed the duty of the judges to adapt and develop 
the princinples of the common law in an orderly fashion they are equally opposed to any 
usurpation by the courts of the functions of Parliament.”); Knuller (Publishing, Printing and 
Promotions) Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1973] A.C. 435, 464-65 (holding that 
courts no longer have the power to make criminal law, but where parliament has not legislated, 
the courts are free to continue enforcing common law); Peter De Cruz, COMPARATIVE LAW 
IN A CHANGING WORLD, 250, 251 (2007). 
42
See Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: 
An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. Legal Stud. 379, 382 (2008) (civil-law systems are 
characterized by their reliance on legislation instead of judge-made law). 
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“law,” at least for them.  More broadly, the decision of a country‟s supreme court or 
constitutional court is viewed with interest by lower court judges and practitioners because it 
permits the legal actors and society in general to predict what the result is likely to be in a similar 
case.
43
 
 The decision of a civil law court may not be seen as binding precedent on lower courts, or 
even on the court rendering the decision - unlike, strictly speaking, in the United States
44
 - but it 
                                                 
43
See Jeffrey G. Miller, A Generational History of Environmental Law and its Grand 
Themes: A near Decade of Garrison Lectures, 19 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 501, 512 (2002) (“Most of 
the world's legal systems are code systems, not common law systems, and do not adhere to the 
stare decisis use of precedent as does the Anglo-American common law system. That does not 
mean they are without jurisprudence or legal doctrine”); Eu Jin Chua, The Laws of the People's 
Republic of China: An Introduction for International Investors, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 133, 136 
(2006) (“As China is a civil law system, prior cases have no binding effect; however, due to an 
increase in foreign litigants, some provincial judges are writing their decisions with more legal 
analysis to provide better guidance for legal practitioners”); Peter De Cruz, COMPARATIVE 
LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD, 250, 262 (2007). 
44
Common law courts always retain the power to overrule prior decisions.  The principle 
of stare decisis imposes a systemic respect for precedent, even when those earlier opinions have 
become suspect or reflect thinking that is no longer in vogue. An example of this can be seen in 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), a decision in which Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, labels the rule of Miranda v. Arizona constitutionally-based.  
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would be overstatement to assert that the opinion has no influence on the application of the law.  
In a civil service system in which advancement through the ranks of the judiciary is determined 
in part by a judge‟s ability to avoid excessive reversals by higher courts, it would be surprising if 
the views of the highest-level judges were not followed closely by the trial courts.
45
  Consistency 
                                                                                                                                                             
That decision depended in large part on the fact that Miranda had been the recognized rule for 
many years and its famous warnings have “become embedded in routine police practice to the 
point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”  530 U.S. at 430.  As the 
Court noted, “Even in constitutional cases, stare decisis carries such persuasive force that the 
Court has always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special 
justification.”  Id. at 429. In spite of this reluctance to tinker with what their predecessors have 
done, common law appellate judges sometimes feel compelled to refine, modify, or even 
abandon earlier iterations of the law. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
45
See Allen Shoenberger, Change in the European Civil Law Systems: Infiltration of the 
Anglo-American Case Law System of Precedent into the Civil Law System, 55 Loy. L. Rev. 5 
(2009) (“In one of the discussions with a justice of the Italian Supreme Court, the justice stated 
that if an Italian judge in a lower court ignored a decision of his court without explaining why (or 
distinguishing it) that judge might be subject to judicial discipline under the Italian system!  In 
another discussion at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, an Advocate General for the 
Court (a position that corresponds to the Solicitor General of the United States) stated that prior 
cases decided by the court are not technically precedent; however, the principles within the prior 
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is a necessary goal of any legal system that seeks legitimacy.  Random and entirely ad hoc 
rulings quickly undermine the confidence of a people in their courts and are not likely to be 
tolerated. This notion of predictability is, in American courts, advanced by deference to 
precedent (or stare decisis), generally understood to mean that the previous opinions of a given 
court should be followed and, further, that lower courts should follow the legal decisions of 
higher courts.  
[Some form of a transition would be helpful here. Something along the lines of: This notion of 
predictability is, in American courts, contained in the notion of precedent (or stare decisis), 
generally understood to mean that the previous opinions of a given court should be followed and, 
further, that lower courts should follow the legal decisions of higher courts.  
 Isn‟t the ruling of an American court “ law” with respect at least to lower courts?  While 
one might say quite correctly that the decision of an intermediate state appellate court is 
“binding” precedent on  trial courts  withinits jurisdiction, that decision usually has no binding 
effect on  trial courts in areas of the state that may fall under the jurisdiction of a different 
intermediate appellate court with a conflicting view or no expressed view..  This is  The decision 
is perhaps persuasive authority in that other region, but only in the way a civil law appellate 
court‟s opinion would be persuasive.  And even the trial courts subject to the jurisdiction of the 
deciding court may distinguish the higher court‟s opinion or find other ways to avoid the strict 
application of its ruling.  The highest level appellate court in the state can, if asked, overrule 
                                                                                                                                                             
decisions must be followed by national courts (i.e. the courts of the 27 nation states in the 
European Union)”). 
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what briefly was “law” announced by a lower appellate court, but the state high court‟s decision 
is not safe from statutory modification or, in some cases, review and reversal by a federal court.   
 Ultimately, American courts do make law, but only in a limited sense.  The divide 
between common law and civil law looms larger in characterization than in reality with respect 
to sources of law.  It is more a matter of degree than a difference in kind.
46
 
 B.  Means of adjudication 
 Perhaps, as some have suggested, the difference lies not in the role of codes versus 
opinions, but in the means by which disputes are adjudicated.
47
  If the American and British 
systems, and those common law systems they have influenced, are inherently adversarial in 
nature, and the civil law countries employ a non-adversarial approach, that distinction may be 
sharper and more meaningful than the sources of law.  Even here, however, the differences - 
while real - are not as vast as imagined.
48
   
                                                 
46
There are, of course, significant differences remaining, even if the distinctions are not 
as sharp as imagined.  See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & J. R. SPENCER, EUROPEAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 27-37 (2002) (cataloging differences in English and continental 
European criminal procedures, particularly in the investigative and appeal phases). 
47
See CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 207 (2001) (trial is without doubt where differences in legal traditions are most 
obvious). 
48
See Denis Salas, The Role of the Judge, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 489 
(Mireille Delmas-Marty & J. R. Spencer, 2002) (distinction between accusatorial and 
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 The most casual observer could not fail to notice that in an American or English trial, the 
lawyers are more active than the judges.  They decide on the theory of the client‟s case and how 
it will be presented.  If the case is to be tried before a jury, the lawyers will organize the evidence 
and formulate their questions in a way that is easiest for the jurors to understand, and most 
effective in shaping the way the jurors will view the evidence.  The trial court judge sits mute 
while the questioning is conducted by the lawyers, afraid to interject the obvious unasked 
question or to make the most innocuous remark for fear that a reviewing court will consider the 
judge‟s participation to be an inappropriate intrusion tainting the supposed neutrality of the 
jury.
49
 
 Indeed, the American trial lawyer, particularly in a state court, will use all of the available 
procedural devices in order to produce from a larger body of potential jurors, the group that will 
be most receptive to his or her presentation.  Either side usually is permitted to take the fact-
finding function from the judge and give it to a jury, leaving the American trial judge with little 
to do other than rule on motions and objections, and formulate a jury instruction - subject, of 
course, to suggestions and objections from the respective lawyers. 
 Even if justice might be subverted by the failure of a lawyer to object to evidence, ask an 
important question, make a particularly effective argument, or avoid harmful strategies, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
inquisitorial systems is outdated and not particularly apposite). 
49
See CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 211 (2001) (some see “summing-up” of case as opportunity to slant the 
evidence). 
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American trial judge sits and watches and listens without intervening.
50
  This passive role is 
made somewhat easier for the judge because she or he is almost totally ignorant of the evidence 
that will be presented.  The judge hears the facts when the jurors hear them. 
 The English judge traditionally has been more active than his or her American 
counterpart.
51
  In England, judges have been much less reticent to play a more active role, even 
in the presence of the jury and despite potential reversal of a conviction for interventions that 
might influence the jurors.
52
  While the examination and cross-examination of witnesses is 
conducted by the lawyers in a fashion strongly resembling that used in the United States, there is 
much less opportunity for English lawyers to shape the jury through selection strategies.  As in 
                                                 
50
To the extent that ineffective assistance of counsel claims and rules of professional 
responsibility are designed to prevent such failures, they do so, if at all, only after the harm has 
been done.  Disciplining a poor lawyer provides no remedy for the ill-served defendant, and 
ineffective assistance claims are notoriously difficult to win. 
51
See CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 210 (2001) (English judge has more prominent role than American counterpart, 
particularly in “summing-up” to jury). 
52
See David Feldman, England and Wales, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A 
WORLDWIDE STUDY 188 (C. Bradley, ed.) (2d ed. 2007) (“The jury is told to disregard any 
indication which the judge might seem to give of his view of the evidence, but the freedom to 
comment on evidence allows the judge to “steer” the jury in a particular direction (although too 
obvious a steer may lead to reversal on appeal).”) 
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many features of the American method of adjudication, this difference reflects a fundamental and 
thorough distrust of government, even as represented by the relatively benign and independent 
figure of the judge.
53
  Ironically, this divergence in the American and English procedural forms 
may be explained by an attitude about government learned largely from America‟s colonial 
experiences with the English crown. 
  A trial in a non-adversarial, civil law court appears very different.
54
  The lawyers are 
relegated to the role of minor functionaries throughout the taking of evidence.  They come to 
modest life in argument about guilt or, more likely, appropriate punishment.  A prosecutor‟s 
most important function may be to recommend a particular disposition.  Examination of 
witnesses by either side in a criminal trial is often quite limited lest the presiding judge interpret 
the suggested questions as implied criticism of the judge‟s competence.  Barring trial testimony 
that is inconsistent with the version of facts related by the witness during the investigative phase 
of the prosecution, no one in the courtroom is hearing the evidence for the first time at trial.  The 
dossier, carefully compiled by the trial judge from materials largely obtained under the direction 
                                                 
53
Further separating the American state trial judge from the influence of a central 
government is the fact that these officials often are popularly elected, sometimes without 
political party affiliation.  In spite of the independence an American judge enjoys from the 
control of other branches of government, the historic vestiges of the colonial period seem firmly 
rooted in the national psyche, effectively preventing significant movement away from the jury or 
toward more active involvement by the judge. 
54
 See generally Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 435-38 (1992) (discussing relative lack of zeal of advocates in 
civil law courts).  
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of the prosecutor or an investigating magistrate prior to trial, and made available in their entirety 
to the defendant, constitutes the trial evidence before the trial event occurs.  The script is written, 
edited, and learned by the players well before its production in front of the public.
55
 
 There usually is no American- or English-style jury in these civil law proceedings, 
although lay judges may form a collegial bench with the professional judge or judges.
56
  The 
absence of unguided lay participants obviates the need for extensive and complicated rules of 
evidence, most of which are designed to ensure that jurors do not hear anything unduly 
prejudicial or unreliable.  Since the professional judge can give hearsay and other questionable 
forms of evidence the weight they deserve, and can guide any lay colleagues who sit in judgment 
alongside him, many evidentiary and procedural rules are simply unnecessary.  There is no time-
consuming jury selection process, no problems with sequestration or jury misconduct, and no 
need for jury instructions.  Judges are free to seek the truth collaboratively with the lawyers who 
appear before the court. 
 All of this presents a conceptual gulf between the adversarial process and the so-called 
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In some countries, like Mexico, there is never any significant public production of the 
evidence.  Guilt is determined primarily on a written record without the kind of continuous, 
public event Americans associate with “trial.” 
56
See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O‟SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 149-50 (2010) (jury trials in 
criminal cases are far from the norm in most other legal systems but lay judges are used  in some 
systems). 
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“inquisitorial” one.  Again, however, the reality is less stark.  In England and the United States, 
as well as other common law countries, the incidence of jury trials is quite small.  
57
Most cases 
are disposed of by a bench trial or, far more likely in America, by entry of a negotiated plea of 
guilt that negates the entire trial procedure.  Rules of evidence still limit what may be presented 
to the judge, but hearsay testimony might be introduced in a bench trial and latitude usually is 
given to the attorneys because the judge supposedly will discount any tainted or unreliable 
evidence.  
 Since jury trials account for such a small percentage of the total number of criminal 
dispositions, the opportunity for full adversarial contests is diminished.
58
  It is true that motion 
practice in anticipation of a trial that may never occur remains adversarial, as does the discovery 
process to some degree.  But in the United States, plea bargaining plays such a dominant role in 
the resolution of criminal cases that motions may not be filed at all, and even if they are, the 
“fight” over them often has more to do with gaining leverage in the plea negotiation that will 
take place later than in the preparation of a case for actual trial.   
                                                 
57
 In an important work describing the decline in jury trial in both civil and criminal 
cases, Marc Galanter notes that, 
From 1962 to 1991, the percentage of trials in criminal cases remained steady between 
approximately 13 percent to 15 percent.  However, since 1991, the percentage of trials in 
criminal cases has steadily decreased (with the exception of one slight increase of 0.06 percent in 
2001): from 12.6 percent in 1991 to less than 4.7 percent in 2002. 
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 495 (2004). 
58
The same is true in England, where few cases are actually tried to a jury.  See 
MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & J. R. SPENCER, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 
18 (2002). 
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 Potentially adversarial motions, including those for change of venue, suppression of 
evidence, and reduction of bail, may be preempted by pre-trial diversion and other litigation 
avoidance techniques. Criminal prosecutions that result in the accused accepting anger 
management counseling, restitution and dismissal, substance abuse classes, or deferred 
adjudication either do not require an aggressively adversarial posture or curtail the usual 
adversarial progress of a case through trial and possible appeal.  More recent efforts to mediate 
criminal cases or employ restorative justice techniques early in the process further limit the 
extent to which an American prosecution is fully adversarial. 
 Discovery, which is rather routine in countries without an adversarial trial culture, can be 
quite contested in America.  While the government must disclose certain materials in its 
possession to the defense as a matter of due process, constitutional constraints prevent the 
disclosure requirement from being truly reciprocal.  Consequently, and in an apparent effort to 
“level the playing field,” courts and state legislatures sometimes afford the accused in the United 
States very little information about the prosecution‟s case as a matter of right, leaving the 
management to the discretion of trial judges.  The result, particularly in cases in which the 
resources or willingness of the defendant‟s lawyer to conduct vigorous independent investigation 
of the facts of the case are limited, is a choice of bad options.  Either the defense counsel will 
negotiate a plea without complete information about the government‟s case - effectively buying 
what the government is selling, sight unseen - or the lawyer will elect the expensive, time-
consuming, and risky trial, a contest that becomes something of a “trial by ambush” because the 
lawyer is less than fully informed. 
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 These peculiar American aspects of the adversarial process have been lamented,
59
 but 
remain largely unchanged.  In this respect, the adversarial character of the American legal system 
is very unlike the more common non-adversarial trial used in most of the world.  But this feature 
ultimately has more to do with the likelihood of a just result than it does with the degree of 
adversariness found in the system.  It is not the adversarial model that puts justice at risk; it is the 
inappropriate application of that model.  In England, rules requiring disclosure of the Crown‟s 
evidence operate to prevent the flow of information to the accused from becoming an adversarial 
struggle without changing the essential nature of the trial process, something that also can be 
seen in American jurisdictions that have adopted more open disclosure requirements. 
IV.  Closing the Gap: Some Examples of Convergence 
 While there may be less distance between common law and civil law (or adversarial and 
non-adversarial) systems than commonly believed, even the remaining gap appears to be 
narrowing.  Examples of this shift can be seen in such diverse procedural aspects of these 
systems as the institution or reinstitution of juries, shifts in control of the trial process from the 
judge to or from the lawyers, implementation of more vigorous direct- and cross-examination, 
and increased judicial independence. 
 A.  The Increasing Use of Juries 
 While Americans would understand the term quite differently, to say that another country 
has a “jury” means little more than that it uses lay participants in the judging of cases.  “Jurors” 
of this type are sometimes called “lay judges” or “lay assessors,” but their role is not the same as 
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See generally Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403 (1992). 
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the British or American jury.  In these common law countries and others, the lay members of the 
jury decide the facts of a case without the direct involvement of the professional judge beyond 
receiving the judge‟s instructions on law orally or in writing.  Deliberations are conducted in 
closed sessions in a manner that is left largely unexplored.  These systems, perhaps not knowing 
how better to answer difficult and perplexing questions of credibility and the like, simply lock 
away the jurors in a little room with the ultimate question and instructions that are largely 
unintelligible to them, and wait for the untrained citizens, like the Oracle of Delphi, to appear 
with an unexplained and unquestioned answer.   
 Other countries, apparently not trusting lay judges to work without supervision, 
incorporate them into a collegial bench, guided by one or more professional judges.
60
  In some 
cases this approach is an artifact of earlier experiences with lay participation,
61
 while for others it 
is an innovation.
62
  Movements toward or away from increased lay involvement in judging are 
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For examples of the mixed bench in Europe, see John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. 
Kovalev, Law Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe, 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 83 (2006).  The 
authors list Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine as European countries employing 
some form of collaborative adjudication.  See id. at 95-98. 
61
See, e.g., Jackson & Kovalev, supra note ___ at 97-98. 
62
For a short but illuminating history of the use, disuse, modification, and development of 
the jury practice in certain European countries, see RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF 
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revealing on several levels, but the effect these institutions have on adversariness may be 
independently significant. 
 The presence of a jury of any sort does not, by itself, necessitate adversarial methods.  
Nevertheless, as has been noted, introducing a lay adjudicative body in the trial - especially an 
independent one - changes the courtroom dynamic and tends to promote a degree of 
adversariness.  If, for example, the jury will be “selected” by means that are not entirely random, 
some process must be used to sort out how selection decisions will be made.  Lay jurors who do 
not deliberate collegially with professional judges are more susceptible to the influences of less-
than-reliable evidence, which leads to concern by the lawyers that the influence will be 
improper.
63
  Consequently, the lawyers will be inclined to request corrective action by the judge, 
or to take advantage of the opportunity to make arguments or introduce evidence that might sway 
the lay observers in their favor.  Rules of evidence may be expanded to counter these efforts, all 
of which creates a more adversarial atmosphere in the trial process. 
 A number of countries have introduced or re-introduced jurors in their criminal procedure 
in recent years, and relatively few have abandoned the practice.  Germany is among those 
countries with a civil law tradition that use lay judges.
64
  The twelve-member jury was abolished 
                                                                                                                                                             
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 233-53 (2005). 
63
 For an interesting exploration of the kind of influence an adversarial advocate may 
have on a jury, and the ameliorating role of the judge, see Annie Cossins, Cross-Examination in 
Child Sexual Assault Trials: Evidentiary Safeguard or an Opportunity to Confuse?, 33 MELB. 
U. L. REV. 68 (2009). 
64
RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 240-46 (2005); 
VOLKER KREY, GERMAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 67-68 (2009); ANKE 
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in Germany in 1924, replaced by a system of lay judges, sometimes referred to as “honorary 
judges.”65  In a model employed by many European countries,66 the lay participants in a German 
trial question witnesses, deliberate on guilt, and decide sentences, just as their professional 
colleagues on the mixed bench.
67
  Questions exist about the actual independence of these lay 
participants, and care must be taken to avoid giving them access to the trial dossier that would 
allow them to prejudge the guilt of the accused,
68
 but they nevertheless continue to function to 
“promote a general understanding of the administration of criminal justice and strengthening 
public confidence in its independence and fairness.”69 
 Germany‟s southern neighbor, Austria, also uses this form of lay judging, but retains a 
British or American style jury as well.
70
 While lay judges, sitting collegially with professional 
                                                                                                                                                             
FRECKMANN & THOMAS WEGERICH, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM113-14 (1999); 
JOHN HATCHARD, BARBARA HUBER & RICHARD VOGLER, COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 143 (1996). 
65
See VOGLER, supra note __; FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note ___. 
66
See Jackson & Kovalev, supra note ___ at 96-97. 
67
See FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note ___ (lay judges have “full voting 
rights”); KREY, supra note ___ at 67 (professional and lay judges cooperate with equal rights in 
the decision on guilt and sentencing). 
68
See KREY, supra note ___ at 68.   
69
See HATCHARD, HUBER, AND VOGLER, supra note ___ at 143. 
70
Austria is not alone among European countries with independent juries.  They also exist 
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counterparts, are used in certain felony cases, an independent eight-person jury decides guilt in 
the most serious felony cases and in political cases.
71
  This American-style jury hears evidence 
that is produced during a trial governed by a three-judge panel of professionals, but the 
deliberations on guilt take place outside the presence of the judges.
72
  Sentencing is a 
collaborative process, with the jurors and the professional judges deciding the matter together.
73
  
The trial itself is conducted in the usual “civil law” or “inquisitorial” fashion, with the evidence 
being assembled and introduced by the presiding judge and his professional colleagues, and not 
primarily by the lawyers representing the parties. 
 As in other countries with lay judges or jurors, Austria seeks by this procedural device to 
democratize its criminal adjudicative process and to introduce a common language to the 
proceedings.
74
  Austrian law professor Herbert Hausmaninger notes that, “Lay participation 
allows for democratic input in criminal procedure and helps to keep the process understandable 
to the public at large.”75  This sentiment is echoed for the German system by Drs. Freckmann 
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Jackson & Nikolay, supra note ___ at 95. 
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HERBERT HAUSMANINGER, THE AUSTRIAN LEGAL SYSTEM  125, 191 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
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Id. at  191. 
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Id. 
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See HAUSMANINGER, supra note ___ at  191. 
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See id. 
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and Wegerich: 
The main reason for installing honorary judges in the courts is that they create a 
link between the judiciary and the people, and, due to this, ensure that justice is 
exercised in a generally comprehensible way and manner.  Honorary judges are 
regarded as representatives of the general public and contribute their specific 
knowledge about society and their ability to assert particular interests.  It is 
intended that social views and experiences of the honorary judges find an 
expression in the ruling of the courts.  Moreover, professional judges are required 
to explain their legal arguments and assessments in a simple and comprehensive 
way which honorary judges - just as the ordinary people - will understand.  This a 
further check before the judgment is rendered.
76
 
 The jury selection process can, of course, encourage or exacerbate adversarial tendencies, 
even if other non-adversarial features are used in the trial itself.  Not only will opposing counsel 
be inclined to posture for the prospective fact-finders during the selection encounter, but he or 
she will seek to introduce, sometimes surreptitiously, suggestions about how the evidence should 
be viewed, and perhaps even to allude to the evidentiary facts that will be developed.  The mixed 
bench model avoids this simply by removing any selection process from the purview of trial 
counsel; they are presented with judges usually chosen by appointment well before the trial 
begins.  Similarly, for the Austrian version of the jury, selection is random and no voir dire or 
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See FRECKMANN & WEGERICH, supra note ___ at 113-14. 
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challenge procedure exists.
77
  It would seem, therefore, that the political and social benefits of a 
jury system need not be tied to a pure adversarial struggle, but may be achieved in part without 
doing violence to inquisitorial ideals.
78
  
 Whatever impact a jury procedure may have on the adversariness one finds in criminal 
processes, countries continue to institute or revive jury systems, including independent juries.  
Russia, Spain, and Japan, all with civil law legal traditions, have joined the ranks of those relying 
in part on lay fact-finders.
79
  Argentina only recently has begun to implement a mixed-bench jury 
trial procedure that existed in its Constitution for many years,
80
 while South Korea is 
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See Jackson & Nikolay, supra note ___ at 102 (random selection of jurors used in 
Austria). 
78
See, e.g., William T. Pizzi, The American “Adversary System”?, 100 W. Va. L. Rev. 
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See RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 246-53 
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See Paul Edwards-Kevin, The Emergence of Trial by Jury in Argentina, GONZAGA J. 
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Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic Countries, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
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experimenting with an independent jury system.
81
 
 In a highly publicized return to use of a jury, Japan held its first jury trial in August of 
2009.
82
  This reform has been called “the most dramatic change to Japan‟s criminal justice 
system since the end of World War II.”83  Like other countries returning to a tradition of jury 
trial, the transition in Japan has not been without its legal and cultural difficulties.
84
  Korea, in an 
“enormous change”85 to its justice system, also has experienced growing pains with its jury 
experiment.
86
 
 Even if the increased use of juries and lay judges does not necessarily say much about the 
growth of adversarial characteristics, or establish a clear trend toward a “middle way,” it at least 
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See Su Hyun Lee, supra note ___ (quoting law professor Cho Kuk). 
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is evidence that strict adherence to the “usual” adjudicative processes of the inquisitorial model 
has eroded.  Since the movement from the stereotypical norm is, so far at least, one-sided,
87
 
experimental, and differentiated, it is premature to attach much significance to this phenomenon 
alone.  There are other reforms under way, however, that represent much more important 
movement away from the traditional methods of civil law. 
 B.  An Intentional Shift Toward Adversarial Trials - The Italian Example 
 Italy presents an example of remarkable and deliberate reform from a traditional civil 
law, non-adversarial system of criminal procedure to one with distinctively common law, 
adversarial elements.
88
  This shift began in 1988, a relatively short time ago in the universe of 
                                                 
87
So far, abandonment of lay judging appears relatively rare.  Countries following the 
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Crim. L. 345 (1994); Antoinette Perrodet, The Italian System, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES 368-69 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J. R. Spencer, 2002). 
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law,
89
 with the passage of legislation, followed in 1989 by its implementation.
90
 
 Even minor reforms to procedure law seem to jar the systems in which they occur.  
Imagine, then, the upheaval brought about by changes to the fundamental procedural premises on 
which a system is built.  It is not surprising that reform of this magnitude generated opposition.  
In spite of strong resistance, though, constitutional changes in 1999 cemented the new Italian 
model in place.
91
 
 These changes fall in three areas: shifting responsibility for investigation from a 
                                                 
89
My observation, based on no empirical research, is that the legal profession in the 
United States changes at a glacial pace, usually requiring at least a decade to fully employ 
significant changes in the usual way of doing business.  Appellate review and “fine-tuning” of 
those “new” procedures can go on indefinitely.  From that perspective, the Italian reforms are, at 
best, in their adolescence, and in many important ways, in their infancy. 
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Crim. L. 345 (1994). 
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Trial System in Italy, 25 Mich. J. Int‟l L. 429, 430-31 (2004) (describing the battles between the 
Italian Parliament and Constitutional Court over adherence to the 1989 reform measures); 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 304 (C. Bradley 2d ed. 2007); 
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magistrateto the public prosecutor;
92
 enhancing the control of the trial by lawyers at the expense 
of the judge;
93
 and introducing a limited form of plea bargaining.
94
  This “revolutionary”95 
                                                 
92
See VOGLER, supra note ___ at 168.  Regarding the abolition of the investigating 
magistrate, Vogler notes,  
The instruction was abolished entirely and replaced by a “preliminary 
investigation”, very much on the German 1975 model.  The office of examining 
magistrate disappeared and the pre-trial is now conducted under the surveillance 
of a “pre-trial judge” (giudize per le indagini preliminari - “gip”) who has almost 
no investigatory role.  All major procedural steps - for example, searches or pre-
trial detention - must be authorised by the gip and it is the responsibility of the 
prosecution, working with the assistance of the judicial police, to collect 
inculpatory evidence in all cases. 
Id. 
93
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94
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change left intact many of the traditional “inquisitorial” procedures,96 grafting on the system only 
these relatively few - but momentous - modifications.   
 The impetus for this change is not entirely clear, but involves a combination of 
circumstances of history, culture, and political and legal tradition.  It has been suggested that the 
codes of the fascist period were viewed as overly authoritarian,
97
 prompting reforms in the 
direction of increased guarantees of openness and efficiency, and away from rampant 
formalism.
98
  Richard Vogler has suggested that increased American political and ideological 
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See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note ___ at 429 (comparative scholars viewed new Italian 
code as “revolutionary”);  Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, 1988 Italian Code of Criminal 
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the 20
th
 Century” for comparativists). 
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See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note ___ at 465 (Italy wants to protect adversarial values 
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See Freccero, supra note ___ at 346-47; Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An 
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Temp. L. Rev. 1211 (1989) (reforms reflect need to compensate parties for power denied them 
by dominant decisionmaker); VOGLER, supra note ___ at 168 . 
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See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 303 (C. Bradley 2d ed. 
2007); VOGLER, supra note ___ at 168. 
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influences following World War II contributed to the interest in an adversarial trial model.
99
  
Perhaps this interest was sparked in part by the hybrid model on display at the Nuremberg War 
Crimes Trial, or in the many romanticized examples depicted in American movies.
100
  Whatever 
the causes, reform efforts began in Italy shortly after World War II, culminating in the 1988 
legislation.
101
 
 Italian prosecutors and defense lawyers now call witnesses and examine and cross-
examine them, a job previously left almost entirely to the presiding judge.
102
  Instead of giving 
the judge access to a dossier filled with the results of the investigation,
103
 the lawyers develop 
the evidence at trial under rules of evidence that were not necessary in the old system of judge-
dominated presentation.
104
  The trial judge is relegated to a role more like a co-participant, 
                                                 
99
See VOGLER, supra, note ___ at 168. 
100
See VOGLER, supra, note ___ at 157 (global resurgence in adversariality driven by 
U.S. hegemony and “ideological influence symbolised by the Hollywood courtroom drama”). 
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See VOGLER, supra, note ___ at 168. 
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See VOGLER, supra, note ___ at 170; V. Cirese & V. Bertucci, THE NEW ITALIAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR FOREIGN JURISTS 161,178 (2d ed. 1993). 
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See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 303 (C. Bradley 2d ed. 
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available). 
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See VOGLER, supra, note ___ at 170; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE 
STUDY 303 (C. Bradley 2d ed. 2007).  This procedure has converted the Italian trial from its 
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having the authority to call witnesses and question them, but only to the extent the parties omit 
significant evidence.
105
  Professors Amodio and Selvaggi summarize the adversarial 
characteristics of the new code:: 
[T]he trial structure exhibits the most peculiar features of the adversary pattern.  
Following the opening speech about case presentation and motions to admit proof, 
both the prosecutor and the counsel for the defendant produce the evidence for 
their cases through direct and cross-examination of witnesses, experts, and the 
defendant himself.  The examination of evidence may look simpler than that 
deeply rooted in the Anglo-American tradition.  But the new Code retains the 
fundamental adversary character of the latter - the prosecution‟s evidence (prove 
a carico) is distinguished from exculpatory evidence (prove a discarico).  The 
burden of introducing evidence as well as the burden of persuasion have become 
the cornerstones of the new Italian system of criminal justice.
106
 
 This shift in emphasis under the 1988 code is described by professors Pizzi and 
Montagna as placing the trial, rather than the investigative stage and the dossier it produced, at 
the “heart of the system” in which “the two contending parties were to produce the evidence and 
                                                                                                                                                             
previous, inquisitorial form.  It is, as two authors have stated, “no longer a trial on evidence, but 
a trial for evidence.”  V. Cirese & V. Bertucci, supra note ___ at 161. 
105
See Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note ___ at 1221. 
106
See Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note ___ at 1220-21. 
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test the evidence at trial.”107  To ensure that the trial judge had no more than limited access to 
information about the case before it was tried,
108
 the reforms require a different judge to 
supervise the investigation phase than the one who presides over the trial.
109
 
 Not every aspect of the Italian trial will look familiar to the Anglo-American lawyer.  As 
noted, the Italian judge may call witnesses and may examine witnesses called by the parties.
110
   
While the latter may sometimes be seen in English courts, and even in American federal courts 
and those of some states, it is rather uncommon for state trial judges in the United States to 
engage in more than the most cursory and occasional questioning of a witness for fear that their 
questions will be misinterpreted by, or improperly influence, the jury.   
 This does not pose the same impediment in the Italian trial where professional judges sit 
collegially with lay judges in the German style, at least for the most serious crimes in the Corte 
di Assise.
111
  Lower level trial courts, the Tribunale and Giudice di Pace, do not employ a mixed 
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See Guilio Illuminati, 4 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 567, 571-72 (2005) (“double 
dossier-system used to avoid corruption of trial judge‟s “virgin mind”).  
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See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note ___ at 435-36. 
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111
Two professional judges sit in combination with six lay judges in the Corte di assise, 
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bench, thereby avoiding the problem altogether.
112
   
 While the introduction of adversarial procedure into the trial stage has perhaps made 
“criminal trials more consistent with the democratic principles of orality, immediacy, and 
publicity,”113 it also has introduced the kind of inefficiency and delay that one would expect from 
a process dominated by opposing counsel rather than the judge..
114
  This, in turn, led to the 
institution of abbreviated trial procedures not entirely unlike those found in the American 
practice of plea-bargaining.
115
 As noted by Rachel van Cleave in her description of this result, it 
is ironic that the less democratic practice was necessitated by the more democratic reform.
116
 
 While the Italian version of plea-bargaining is very limited in comparison with its free-
wheeling American counterpart, it nevertheless remains the “most important novelty in the new 
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code.”117  To understand why plea-bargaining is viewed as novel in Italy, one need look no 
further than the strong-judge/weak-advocate model usually characteristic of Continental, 
inquisitorial systems.  Plea-bargaining, by contrast, is essentially the placing of control over the 
issues of guilt and sentencing of the accused in the hands of the lawyers.  It runs directly counter 
to the inquisitorial tradition of leaving such matters to the professional judges, acting either alone 
or collegially with lay judges. 
 Italy has softened the impact of its reforms on this tradition by retaining in the judge 
ultimate power to control and accept or reject any proposed arrangement reached by the 
parties.
118
  Also, the Italian model does not encompass, as does American plea-bargaining, what 
is known as “charge bargaining.”119  Only reductions in sentence are possible.  Abbreviated or 
alternative trials are available for less serious offenses, but not for more serious ones, and only 
with the collaboration of the judge.
120
  The procedure code specifies the circumstances under 
which the accused is entitled to use one of these devices, and the prosecutor lacks the authority to 
“not bargain” if the trial court determines that an alternative to trial is preferable and the accused 
                                                 
117
See V. Cirese & V. Bertucci, supra note ___ at 223  
118
See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note ___ at 443-44 (ultimate control in the judge 
preserves judicial independence). 
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See Jenia I. Turner, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 273 (2009).  “Charge 
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desires it.
121
 
 Because plea-bargaining is so deeply inconsistent with the foundational principles of 
inquisitorial or non-adversarial legal systems, it is truly remarkable that any form of the practice 
exists within a procedure that remains rooted in that tradition.  As Pizzi and Montagna explain: 
Plea bargaining would be a challenge to any country with a civil law heritage.  It 
is not surprising that Italy has only approached the topic gradually and that the 
Italian system is trying hard to soften the challenge that plea bargaining makes to 
the principle that similar defendants should be treated similarly as well as to the 
independent authority of the trial judge to see that the sentence of the defendant is 
adequate for the crime in question.  To date, 85 percent of all criminal cases go to 
trial.  This, of course, contrasts sharply with the U.S. criminal justice system 
where the plea bargaining rate is over 90 percent in most jurisdictions.
122
 
 Although Italy‟s experiment in plea-bargaining has proven challenging and not altogether 
successful, it nevertheless has been influential.   European countries, inspired by the Italian 
example and others, have begun to adopt the practice for the same reasons: efficiency and 
reduction of delays and costs, especially those associated with, or caused by, other procedural 
                                                 
121
See Pizzi & Montagna, supra note ___ at 440-43 (trial judge retains control and can 
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122
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reforms.
123
  Russia and Bulgaria, for example, have adopted plea-bargaining procedures modeled 
on the Italian experience.
124
 
 Even Germany has begun to employ an informal kind of negotiation, one that is wholly 
outside the long-standing formal prohibition on plea bargaining.
125
  This practice has developed 
more as a matter of convenience and flexibility, rather than as part of an overt reform effort, and 
it is not modeled expressly on the practices of any particular country.
126
  One author has referred 
to the spread of plea-bargaining over the past three decades as a “quiet revolution,”127 that 
“illustrates several different ways in which criminal procedure practices in different legal 
systems can converge.”128 
   
 The convergence of European legal systems, and the institution of procedures within 
those systems bearing closer resemblance to features of the Anglo-American system, is 
significant, but not shocking.  After all, in a world in which there is instantaneous 
communication, frequent and rapid intercontinental transportation, cross-pollination of 
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economies, ideas, and cultures, the rise of English as a universal second-language, and the 
development of large multinational trading blocs, it is hardly surprising that Starbucks competes 
in Vienna with traditional cafes, or that Fiat has acquired a sizable, and potentially a majority, 
stake in Chrysler. The extension of these influences into law and legal systems seems inevitable.  
The reach of  this realignment to such diverse regions as Latin America and China illustrates 
how pervasive this trend toward a “third way” has become. 
 Without much fanfare, Latin America has shifted quite remarkably in the direction of 
accusatorial procedure within the past decade.
129
  Richard Vogler notes that, “Compared with the 
deeply contested and protracted reform process in western Europe, the impact of adversariality 
on Latin America, at least at the level of procedural reform, has been little short of explosive.”130  
All but a handful of countries in South and Central America have introduced a new 
“accusatorial” code over the past fifteen years.131   
C.   Bridging a Very Large Gap - A Chinese System With Western Characteristics 
  
The movement has begun in China as well.  This level of systemic reform is all the more 
                                                 
129
See VOGLER, supra note ___ at 172-75; Maximo Langer, 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 617 
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130
VOGLER, supra note ___ at 172. 
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JUL A.B.A. J. 44 (2009). 
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remarkable, given that country‟s roots in communism rather than in a more Euro-centric civil 
law tradition.  If it is true that the reform trends in Latin America  have been motivated by 
“largely financial” considerations,132 the shift to a market-based economy in China also must be 
driving the adoption of rules and processes that are more “friendly” to Western nations and their 
commercial concerns.
133
  While commerce may not seem, at first blush, to be concerned with 
criminal procedure rules, negative reaction from consumers limits the ability of global 
companies to do business with impunity in countries that pay little heed to human and civil 
rights, or that do not employ a  criminal process that appears more “fair” and mainstream. 
 This impetus for reform in China has been attributed by Richard Vogler to the 
globalization of trade and the influence of China‟s trading partners: 
The next wave of post-war adversarial reform has resulted in the almost complete 
destruction of the concept of „socialist legality‟ in the former Soviet bloc and 
China.  As in Latin America, change has been rapid and is being accomplished 
under intense pressure from the U.S. and western Europe.  However, despite 
competition from moderate forms of European inquisition-process, it is Anglo-
American adversariality which has dominated the reform agenda.  This 
dominance to some extent reflects the balance of influence amongst the donor 
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9 Chinese J. Int'l L. 193, 194 (2010): 
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countries, whose national expert groups have each been vocal in promoting the 
virtues of their own model systems.
134
 
As part of the pressure for change, Vogler also cites the Chinese campaign for WTO membership 
as moving the country toward due process and the “rule of law.”135  The People’s Daily credited 
media exposure of “unjust cases” with providing impetus for reform.136 
  In comparison with the reforms of the Italian and Latin American systems, those in 
China are modest.  They represent, however, a much more radical break with tradition, which 
virtually assures that they will be implemented more slowly.  While the traditional legal culture 
may slow acceptance of the shift toward due process and some adversarial characteristics, the 
power of the central government to effect and enforce national rule changes should not be 
underestimated. 
 To generalize, criminal procedure in China prior to 1996 was characterized by a court-
controlled process in which defense counsel -when there was one - played no significant role.  
The “trial” was an event in which evidence already assembled by the police, procurator, and 
court was rarely questioned for fear of implying criticism of those organs.  No presumption of 
                                                 
134
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innocence existed in any formal expression,
137
 and the trial usually formalized guilt summarily 
before proceeding to the real purpose of the ceremony: sentencing.
138
  Decisions were guided by 
the needs of the people (government), and lower court decisions could be reversed or modified 
for political reasons.  Judicial independence did not exist in any significant degree.
139
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See DANIEL C. K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE‟S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 279 (2d ed. 2009).  Professor Chow describes the pre-1997 environment as follows: 
Under the 1979 CPL, many judges were biased in favor of finding guilt once a 
case was brought to trial based upon the notion that if the police and procuratorate 
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the defendant must be guilty to some degree.  Aggressive police and 
procuratorates were also known to intimidate witnesses into confessions of guilt 
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under the 1979 CPL, many observers in the PRC were known to remark that in 
reality the opposite was true: a criminal suspect was usually presumed guilty until 
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Id. 
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Bradley 2d ed. 2007). 
139
See generally Robert Davidson & Zheng Wang, The Court System in the People’s 
Republic of China With a Case Study of a Criminal Trial, COMPARATIVE & 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 205-18 (O. Ebbe 2d ed. 2000); DANIEL 
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 The passage of criminal procedure reforms in 1996 signaled the introduction of 
fundamental changes, at least in principle, simultaneously both in the direction of greater regard 
for human rights and in more adversarial processes.
140
  Although the presumption of innocence is 
not stated directly and clearly,
141
 it is implied by various provisions of the 1996 Criminal 
Procedure Law.
142
  The judge‟s role as investigator has been curtailed, and the court‟s access to 
evidence gathered in anticipation of trial has been limited.
143
  Defendants enjoy the right to 
counsel during the investigative phase, and not merely days before trial as previously had been 
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Rules, The Christian Science Monitor (Aug. 16, 2001), 
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the case.
144
  The right to silence has been instituted and is being implemented in at least some 
provincial courts.
145
  Defense lawyers, along with prosecutors, now have the ability to examine 
and cross-examine witnesses, while the trial judge plays a more passive role, hearing much of the 
evidence for the first time at trial.
146
  And very importantly, trial judges have a degree of 
independence previously unknown.
147
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 Thirty years of reform,
148
 however, have not necessarily produced dramatic change.  
Acquittal rates, which rose after the institution of reforms in 1996, fell subsequently, leading 
Professor Daniel C. K. Chow to observe that the rates “do not indicate whether more guilty or 
innocent defendants are being acquitted since the specifics of each case will vary, but they 
indicate that no extraordinary changes have occurred in the PRC criminal justice system.”149   
 It is tempting to hope that improved access to trained lawyers and judges will lead to 
realization of the goals embodied within Chinese reforms.  This hope is fueled by a gradual 
change from judges and lawyers with little or no legal background
150
 to entry examinations and 
training in law for judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, all of which occurred during the time period 
of criminal procedure reform.
151
  It was not until 2007, however, that qualifications approaching 
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those found in most developed countries were required.
152
  Nevertheless, it remains possible to 
practice law in China without having obtained a college or university education, and 
incompetence within the legal profession remains a serious problem.
153
   
 Although increased professionalism and higher qualification standards may eventually 
produce an improved adherence to the rule of law within the criminal justice system, it remains 
to be seen whether these goals can be achieved without further structural change.
154
  Professors 
Sida Liu and Terence Halliday reject that possibility in the absence of fundamental political 
reform:  
[A]wareness of the structural configurations of power that underlie criminal 
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woap.htm (reporting that President Jiang Zemin counseled Senator Arlen Spector to be patient 
because the Chinese are “working on the rule of law”). 
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procedure law in China helps avoid naïve notions that more precise formal law, 
more training of lawyers and judges, or more refinement of purely legal 
institutions will suffice to produce a criminal procedure law consistent with global 
norms without reconstruction of the state.
155
 
Such pessimism may be premature in a reform regime that is relatively young, but it also is too 
soon to declare the reforms successful.  The articulation and codification of these goals, whatever 
the motivation or likelihood of success, represent significant change in direction, a direction that 
in many respects is consistent with other examples already examined.   
V.  Hybrid Procedure Forms - Something Borrowed, or Something New? 
 These reform efforts in China, Italy, and countries within Latin America have been ad 
hoc rather than part of a coordinated international, regional, or multi-national reconsideration of 
procedure rules.  Whether they are the result of external pressures or influences, or instead the 
product of internal, domestic forces, all of them were initiated by the individual states.  Since 
criminal law and criminal procedure historically have been among the most localized and 
domesticated areas of law, it is not surprising that, while countries may look outside their borders 
for inspiration and example, they have been reluctant to cede any significant measure of 
autonomy on these issues.
156
 
                                                 
155
See Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity in Legal Change: Lawyers and 
Reforms of China’s Criminal Procedure Law, 34 L. & SOC. INQ. 911, 945 (2009). 
156
For example, some members of the Supreme Court of the United States have expressed 
hostility toward consideration of international norms or the laws of other nations in deciding 
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 The Nuremberg trials conducted at the conclusion of World War II marked the first 
modern imposition of international or multi-national norms and procedures by a group of nations 
to try individuals for crimes perpetrated by the defendants against their own people.
157
  This was 
a remarkable event, made even more significant by the Allies‟ adoption and use of rules of 
procedure specially designed for this purpose, and adapted from both accusatorial and 
inquisitorial traditions.
158
  The procedural rules used, however, were determined in large part by 
                                                                                                                                                             
domestic matters.  See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“We Americans have a method for making the laws that are over us. We elect 
representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which must enact the new law and present it 
for the approval of a President, whom we also elect. For over two decades now, unelected federal 
judges have been usurping this lawmaking power by converting what they regard as norms of 
international law into American law.”) 
157
See LINDA CARTER, CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY & PETER HENNING, 
GLOBAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL LAW 111 (2007) (Nuremberg and Tokyo trial were first 
international criminal trials in modern times).  
158
See Dianne Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 818-19 (2000) (London Charter 
adopted by Allies for trial of Nazi war criminals bridged the divide between the traditions and 
amounted to an “international code of criminal procedure”).  The Allies represented a wide 
spectrum of procedural traditions.  Great Britain and the United States employed variations of 
the Common Law; France was quintessentially Civil Law; and the U.S.S.R. followed a 
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the nature of the evidence to be offered against the accused, and by the relatively large numbers 
of defendants tried in a single proceeding.  Because the Nazi defendants had maintained 
voluminous and often meticulous records of their actions, the trials were dominated by written 
forms of evidence rather than live witness testimony.  Lengthy trials of individuals, which would 
have frustrated the people of the victorious nations, were unnecessary due to the nature of the 
evidence. 
 While this seed of multinational adjudication took many years to germinate, the 
Nuremberg example eventually sprouted in a variety of forms.  Its legacy includes regional legal 
regimes, such as that promulgated to enforce the norms embodied in the European Convention 
on Human Rights,
159
 recent integration efforts within the European Union (the “E.U.” or 
“Union”), ad hoc tribunals to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity in the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, and most recently, the permanent International Criminal 
Court.  All of these are independently significant as studies in supranational enforcement of 
international or regional norms; collectively, they signify an influence on, or reflection of, shared 
                                                                                                                                                             
socialist/communist form of inquisitorial process.  Arriving at an acceptable common procedure 
undoubtedly posed a significant obstacle to the institution of a common tribunal. 
159
The procedures used in the Nuremberg IMT have not been replicated exactly in any of 
these more recent institutional examples.  Its form, which incorporated aspects of both an 
adversarial and non-adversarial approach, serves as an example of hybridization only.  Whether 
one sees the IMT as a predominately adversarial procedure or a non-adversarial one, the view of 
international human rights law it spawned has had a lasting impact. 
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procedural practices.
160
 
 A.  The European Court of Human Rights 
 The Council of Europe in 1950 adopted a declaration of human rights, which includes an 
enforcement mechanism for violations of the guarantees within it.
161
  The European Court of 
Human Rights, sitting in Strasbourg, hears complaints of violations by member states, and its 
rulings are binding on those members.
162
  In effect, European member states treat this judicial 
body as an extraterritorial  constitutional court with judges who are not necessarily their citizens, 
applying laws and procedures that may be very unlike those of the country whose case is being 
                                                 
160
It also is extraordinary that, at least in most of these cases, states willingly ceded power 
to communal institutions to act as final arbiters of rules and processes that may be inconsistent 
with their own legal traditions.  
161
See Dianne Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 827 (2000); CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN EUROPE 15 (R. Vogler & B. Huber eds. 2008) (European Convention on 
Human Rights “was given practical qpplication through its own enforcement mechanism 
involving the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights”). 
162
See Amann, supra note ___ at 828; DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O‟SULLIVAN & 
DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 137 
(2010) (decisions by European Court of Human Rights and other human rights tribunals 
sometimes force “modifications in national rules to conform to regional and universal norms”). 
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considered.
163
 
 The court has proven itself quite successful in adjudicating European human rights 
complaints to the satisfaction of the states who are subject to its rulings.  Its influence now 
extends beyond Europe, and within Europe, beyond the original Convention itself.
164
  The ECHR 
demonstrates that supranational regimes may be layered over national legal systems, but it does 
not establish that countries will voluntarily abandon their domestic procedures and adopt a new 
common set in order to achieve the benefits of universality.  The European effort to achieve that 
more elusive goal is the “Corpus Juris” project. 
 B.  Harmonization or Unification of Criminal Procedure Within the E.U.? - The 
Corpus Juris Project 
 Although a multinational European effort to establish regional procedural rules beyond 
fundamental human rights was discussed as early as 1977, it was not until 1995 that the 
European Parliament commissioned a group of experts to consider uniform laws and procedural 
                                                 
163Professor Amann notes that, “through a process that bears resemblance to the 
development of a constitutional criminal procedure in the United States, the European court has 
established a rule of law that all forty-one states now subject to its jurisdiction must abide.” See 
Amann, supra note ___ at 828. 
164
See Amann, supra note ___ at 829-30 (Convention‟s principles matter outside Europe 
and the Court‟s opinions guide other tribunals and influence other national courts); CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN EUROPE 15 (R. Vogler & B. Huber eds. 2008) (ECHR “has exercised an 
ever-expanding role in the reform and the approximation of criminal procedure in Europe”). 
  61 
rules for EU member states regarding the protection of financial interests within the European 
Community (EC).
165
  The thrust of the experts‟ work was to study and propose a set of unifying 
substantive crimes and procedures in support of the essentially economic superstructure that is 
the heart of the European Union.  The product of this effort (referred to as “Corpus Juris”) has 
been variously described, depending on the perspective of the observer, but one European 
commentator summed it up as follows: 
The Corpus Juris proposes a model of organized and structured “verticalization”, 
by laying down a coherent but not exhaustive system of rules (explicit statement 
of the text) establishing some substantive criminal law provisions, concerning 
common offences and common general principles which should apply to them, 
and some criminal procedure provisions which develop two basic ideas: the 
establishment of a European Public Prosecutor and the principle of European 
territoriality.
166
 
 The language of this statement that the “model” set forth by Corpus Juris would 
“verticalize” certain substantive and procedural rules, stands in contrast to any notion that the 
                                                 
165
See Corpus Juris: Introducing Penal Provisions for the Purpose of the Protection of 
the Financial Interests of the European Union I (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1997)(hereinafter 
“Corpus Juris”); Amann, supra note ___ at 835-36. 
166
See Rosaria Sicurella, Towards a European Legal Area: A Few Guidelines for 
European Rules of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE WITHIN 
THE EU AND BEYOND 28 (F. Höpfel & B. Hüber, eds. 1997). 
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experts‟ proposal was intended as mere “harmonization” or horizontal integration of the differing 
codes and traditions within the EU.
 
 “Verticalization” describes a hierarchical, top-down ordering 
that would require EU countries to adhere to procedures adopted in Brussels.  Contrast with this 
scheme the promulgation of a “model” procedure code or set of guidelines designed, not to 
impose a single set of rules, but to allow countries to modify their own systems in ways 
consistent with, but not necessarily the same as, those of their neighbors.  For instance, if the 
ALI‟s Model Penal Code were to be imposed on all of the United States, that set of crimes would 
be vertically integrated.  But if - as was the case - the MPC was published merely as a 
“suggestion” which states were free to adopt in whole or part, or to ignore completely, it might 
influence states to integrate horizontally their disparate criminal codes, or to harmonize them.  
“Harmonization” measures are described in Corpus Juris as those taken “in order to 
reduce the most glaring differences between national laws, without actually going as far as to 
impose rules that are identical.”168  The difference in harmonization of procedure rules, and in 
the unification of such standards, occupies a central place in any effort to develop a workable set 
of processes to serve an entire global region. 
 While the United States successfully operates under a dual legal system that maintains 
the sovereignty of “member states” as it recognizes the federal government‟s right to regulate 
certain activities affecting the nation, establishing such a system from a trading confederation of 
independent countries with diverse languages, customs, histories, and legal traditions, is a 
daunting prospect.  The difficulty is increased by realization that creation of EU prosecutors and 
                                                 
168
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___ at 11. 
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EU courts to practice EU procedures in the prosecution of EU crimes “against the financial 
interests” of the EU represents not just a ceding of control in a well-defined and limited sphere of 
interest, but might easily lead to an expansive, separate criminal justice system dealing with 
much more than fraud suspects who flee from Spain to France.  If the Europeans needed an 
example of how readily “financial interests” might be affected by virtually any offense, they 
need look no further than to the scope of Congress‟s regulation of “commerce” in the United 
States and the growing body of federal criminal law.
169
 
 Corpus Juris implicitly recognizes both the political difficulty
170
 in gaining approval for 
establishment of a central European criminal justice system, and the inherent advantages in 
having a unified form of enforcement and prosecution.  Speaking of procedure and evidence 
rules, Corpus Juris includes the observation that, “Harmonisation is undoubtedly harder to 
achieve in this area given the extreme diversity of national systems.  However, procedure and 
evidence, even more than the rules of substantive law, affect the efficiency of the whole of the 
system.  That is why disparities in this area may lead in practice to impunity against some, while 
others have proceedings brought against them.”171  In the end, the experts observed that 
“harmonisation, aimed at strengthening justice and efficiency, contributes to the complexity of 
                                                 
169
 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Commerce Clause authorizes federal  
prohibition of intrastate growing of marijuana).  
170
See M. DELMAS-MARTY & J.A.E. VERVAELE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE CORPUS JURIS IN THE MEMBER STATES vi (Intersentia 2000) (harmonisation of 
criminal law and of its procedure remains a politically sensitive topic). 
171
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___ at 15. 
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the whole.”172  Adopting an interesting compromise position, they concluded: 
 For this reason, we propose a radically new response to the absurdity, 
widely condemned but still tolerated, which consists in opening up borders to 
criminals whilst closing them to law enforcement agencies, at the risk of 
transforming our countries into havens for crime.  This is not a criminal code, nor 
a unified code of European criminal procedure made directly applicable 
everywhere by European courts set up for the purpose.  What we propose is a set 
of penal rules, which constitute a kind of corpus juris, limited to the penal 
protection of the financial interests of the European Union, designed to ensure, in 
a largely unified European legal area, a fairer, simpler and more efficient system 
of repression. .... While there are sometimes areas of convergence between one 
national system and another, allowing the definition of a common law “of 
confluence”, there remain in many cases divergences which only a common law 
“of synthesis” can overcome.  And finally the gaps, which are common in this 
relatively new area dealing with the protection of supranational interests, also 
make it necessary to draw up what could be termed a common law of 
supplement.
173
 
 Protests to the contrary notwithstanding, Corpus Juris does contemplate a “criminal 
code” and a “unified code of European criminal procedure made directly applicable everywhere 
                                                 
172
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___ at 17. 
173
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___ at 18. 
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by European courts set up for the purpose.”174  This point has not been lost on critics in, and 
outside of, the member states.
175
  Their criticism focuses on the establishment of a European 
public prosecutor, the possible loss of trial rights (e.g., an independent jury), creation of an 
investigating magistrate procedure, and - more generally - the relinquishment of judicial 
authority to persons not of the critic‟s country.176  These concerns are unlikely to be satisfied, 
                                                 
174“Rather than permit national courts to try to accommodate different legal practices, 
Corpus Juris would establish one set of laws to govern a select group of crimes, all of which 
bring financial harm to the European Union.” See Amann, supra note ___ at 836-37. 
175
See, e.g., Corpus Juris by Stealth, at http://www.kc3.co.uk/~dt/CorpusJuris.htm; 
European Union Wants to Introduce a New Legal System: Corpus Juris, at 
http://www.poptel.org.uk/against-eurofederalism/cj44.htm (arguing against establishment of a 
European public prosecutor and centralized investigating magistrate); The European Union 
Criminal Code That Will Overthrow Habeas Corpus and Trial by Jury in UK, at 
http://www.hazankert.com/corpusjuris3.html (EU would become the single prosecuting authority 
in cases of suspected budget fraud, acting under its own rules of investigation and trial); Ralph 
Maddocks, Corpus Juris, at http://www.quebecoislibre.org/990612-6.htm (European prosecutor 
would be independent of national authorities and institutions; trial by jury would disappear; 
arrests without evidence would be allowed; accused would be assumed to be guilty). 
176
See id.; Nile Gardiner & Sally McNamara, The EU Lisbon Treaty: Gordon Brown 
Surrenders Britain’s Sovereignty, WebMemo No. 1840 (March 7, 2008) (Treaty of Lisbon 
would “further erode the legal sovereignty of European nation-states” by “entrenching a pan-
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and may actually be exacerbated, by the notion that a “common law”177 would grow with the 
implementation of the proposals embodied in Corpus Juris, or by the overt attempts within the 
proposed rules to protect the individual interests of the member states.
178
 
 Corpus Juris proposes to create a single criminal justice system to deal with European 
financial crimes.  To accomplish this, it tries to blend existing legal traditions into a procedural 
regime that reflects the cultures that would be subjected to its jurisdiction.
179
  For instance, rather 
                                                                                                                                                             
European magistracy, a European Public Prosecutor, a federal EU police force, and an EU 
criminal code”) MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & J. R. SPENCER, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES 63 (2002) (proposal “has been distorted by the violently hostile reaction of the 
right-wing press” which characterized it as a “federalist plot, hatched in Brussels”). 
177
Corpus Juris establishes the “common law” regime explicitly in Article 26, Sec. 3: 
On application of the general rule on the subsidiarity of national law (Article 35), 
national courts must refer to the rules in the European corpus and, if there is a 
lacuna, apply the national law.  They are bound in all cases to give grounds for the 
penalty by reference to circumstances pertaining to the particular case, applying 
the rules set out above. 
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___, Art. 26, Sec. 3. 
178
For example, the investigating magistrate is referred to as the “judge of freedoms” who 
is responsible for safeguarding the rights of the person being investigated and is a judge of the 
member state‟s judiciary.  See Amann, supra note ___ at 837.   
179
See Amann, supra note ___ at 837 (report proposes a system of investigation and 
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than urge creation of a central EU court in the fashion of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Corpus Juris contemplates national courts following EU law.
180
  In its Commentary, the Corpus 
Juris experts reconcile the procedural rules
181
 by noting that “the differences between the 
accusatorial and the inquisitorial traditions are smaller than at the preparatory stage as it is 
considered everywhere that oral and adversarial proceedings are paramount during trial.”182  This 
observation undoubtedly would be startling to many European jurists who consider adversarial 
proceedings to be quite foreign, and even inconsistent with their “inquisitorial” practices.  On the 
most obvious trial issue, the use of an independent jury, the proposed rules initially made clear 
that “professional judges” must decide cases, and “not simple jurors or lay magistrates.”183  This 
choice, which may have satisfied many within the EU,  but which drew sharp criticism from the 
English-speaking countries,
184
 was grounded on a distrust of “inexperienced people” making 
                                                                                                                                                             
adjudication that would combine aspects of accusatorial and inquisitorial methods). 
180
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___ , Art. 26. 
181
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___ , Art. 26. 
182
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___ at 65. 
183
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___ at 65-66. 
184
See, e.g., Corpus Juris by Stealth, at http://www.kc3.co.uk/~dt/CorpusJuris.htm; 
European Union Wants to Introduce a New Legal System: Corpus Juris, at 
http://www.poptel.org.uk/against-eurofederalism/cj44.htm (arguing against establishment of a 
European public prosecutor and centralized investigating magistrate); The European Union 
Criminal Code That Will Overthrow Habeas Corpus and Trial by Jury in UK, at 
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important decisions about guilt and innocence.
185
  Because of the controversy it caused in 
Britain, the proposal was dropped during a subsequent feasibility review.
186
 
 However beneficial it would be to establish a regional legal regime with uniform 
procedure,  it will be difficult, if not impossible, to persuade diverse, sovereign peoples to 
abandon long-held and cherished notions of what constitutes due process in favor of a system 
cobbled together by compromise.  Harmonization, rather than unification, of processes seems 
somewhat less difficult, but it faces many of the same obstacles.  German Judge Wolfgang 
Schomburg opined on this point that: 
 An overall - i.e. over and above EU interests - harmonised body of 
common European substantive criminal law seems neither feasible nor desirable 
given the need to maintain national and regional particularities.  Nor is it possible 
to forcibly impose harmonisation of procedural law.  Approximation will to some 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.hazankert.com/corpusjuris3.html (EU would become the single prosecuting authority 
in cases of suspected budget fraud, acting under its own rules of investigation and trial); Ralph 
Maddocks, Corpus Juris, at http://www.quebecoislibre.org/990612-6.htm (European prosecutor 
would be independent of national authorities and institutions; trial by jury would disappear; 
arrests without evidence would be allowed; accused would be assumed to be guilty). 
185
See Corpus Juris, supra note ___ at 65-66. 
186
See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & J. R. SPENCER, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES 64 (2002) (“Corpus II” eliminated the “professional judge only” rule for fraud 
offenses). 
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extent occur of its own accord as a result of competition between the systems and 
increased cooperation.
187
 
                                                 
187
Wolfgang Schomburg, Are We on the Road to a European Law-Enforcement Area?  
International Cooperation in Criminal Matters.  What Place for Justice?, 8/1 EUR. J. CRIME, 
CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 51, 57 (2000). J. R. Spencer explains this harmonizing effect in this 
way:  
[A] number of ... developments ... oblige the Member States to change their rules 
of criminal procedure to conform to some common European norm.  Of those that 
do not, furthermore, a number are likely to have an indirectly harmonising effect.  
An example is the proposed system for mutual recognition of criminal judgments.  
This was in fact proposed with a view to enabling diverse criminal justice systems 
to work together, and not in order to force them to harmonise their rules.  
However, a system under which the criminal courts of one Member State are 
obliged to give effect to the decisions of another is unlikely to work unless each 
court has faith in the quality of those decisions - and to ensure this faith, a degree 
of harmonisation between the procedures of the different countries may 
eventually prove necessary.  But even those developments that do not require the 
Member States to change their laws will obviously lead to greater contact between 
lawyers, policemen, prosecutors and judges from different countries, and, with it, 
greater openness to other systems‟ institutions and ideas. 
See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & J. R. SPENCER, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
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If Judge Schomburg is correct, a degree of harmonization is possible - and even likely because of 
cooperation in other areas of law and commerce - but immediate adoption of a supranational 
procedural regime is unlikely.
188
 
 More than a decade after the unveiling of Corpus Juris, only some of its proposals have 
been adopted and instituted.  There is now a “European arrest warrant”189 applicable throughout 
the EU, and efforts have been made to extend this initiative to a similar “European evidence 
warrant” (search warrant).190  Discussions regarding uniform standards for protecting the rights 
of the accused also have continued,
191
 but wholesale adoption of the rules proposed in Corpus 
Juris has not yet occurred.  In public remarks, Franco Frattini, the European Commissioner for 
Justice, Freedom and Security, spoke of the “pressing need for language and especially legal 
                                                                                                                                                             
PROCEDURES 60 (2002). 
188
It must be noted, however, that the same might have been said of the adoption of a 
common currency within the EU, a feat that largely has been accomplished.   
189
See Oreste Pollicino, European Arrest Warrant and Constitutional Principles of the 
Member States: A Case Law-Based Outline in the Attempt to Strike the Right Balance Between 
Interacting Legal Systems, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1313 (2008). 
190
F. Frattini, European commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security, 
Remarks at 4
th
 European Jurists Forum on “Helping EU citizens seize opportunities: EU‟s 
policies and legislation in the area of freedom, security and justice” 4 (May 3, 
2007)(SPEECH/07/270, available at http://europa.eu/geninfo/query/resultaction.jsp?page=1). 
191
See Frattini supra note ___ at 4. 
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language which is as far as possible uniform” while making “allowance for the differences that 
exist between common-law systems, civil-law systems and the other legal systems, sometimes 
quite distinctive, that exist in the Far East.”192  In further remarks reminiscent of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Commissioner Frattini also asserted that, 
“Mutual recognition is as crucial in criminal matters as it is the case in civil matters. ... Mutual 
recognition implies that Member States‟ police and judicial authorities should recognise judicial 
decisions taken in another Member State as equivalent to their domestic decisions, without any 
substantial review.”193   
 While Corpus Juris has not yet produced a full-fledged system of substantive and 
procedural criminal law, its influence remains considerable.
194
  The discussions that have 
surrounded the formulation and implementation of Corpus Juris, the study in 2001 of the “future 
of judicial integration in Europe” that preceded the addition of Eastern European states to the 
EU,
195
 and even the heated rhetoric in opposition to the creation of a single European legal 
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See Frattini supra note ___ at 2. 
193
See Frattini supra note ___ at 4 (emphasis in original). 
194
See VOGLER, supra note ___ at 277 (creation of universal procedure code, as in 
Corpus Juris, “is still exercising its powerful fascination”); MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & J. 
R. SPENCER, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 50-51 (2002) (pressure to converge 
runs “both ways,” from EU to member states and from members to the Community). 
195
See Christine van den Wyngaert, The Protection of the Financial Interests of the EU in 
the Candidate States: Perspectives on the Future of Judicial Integration in Europe, STUDY ON 
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area,
196
 all have contributed to the conception of a workable integration of diverse legal 
traditions.
197
  It may be impossible to determine whether this on-going debate has prompted 
                                                                                                                                                             
“PENAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS, SETTLEMENT, WHISTLEBLOWING 
AND CORPUS JURIS IN THE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES (Final Report, Sept. 19, 2001). 
196
See, e.g., Corpus Juris by Stealth, at http://www.kc3.co.uk/~dt/CorpusJuris.htm; 
European Union Wants to Introduce a New Legal System: Corpus Juris, at 
http://www.poptel.org.uk/against-eurofederalism/cj44.htm (arguing against establishment of a 
European public prosecutor and centralized investigating magistrate); The European Union 
Criminal Code That Will Overthrow Habeas Corpus and Trial by Jury in UK, at 
http://www.hazankert.com/corpusjuris3.html (EU would become the single prosecuting authority 
in cases of suspected budget fraud, acting under its own rules of investigation and trial); Ralph 
Maddocks, Corpus Juris, at http://www.quebecoislibre.org/990612-6.htm (European prosecutor 
would be independent of national authorities and institutions; trial by jury would disappear; 
arrests without evidence would be allowed; accused would be assumed to be guilty); Nile 
Gardiner & Sally McNamara, The EU Lisbon Treaty: Gordon Brown Surrenders Britain’s 
Sovereignty, WebMemo No. 1840 (March 7, 2008) (Treaty of Lisbon would “further erode the 
legal sovereignty of European nation-states” by “entrenching a pan-European magistracy, a 
European Public Prosecutor, a federal EU police force, and an EU criminal code”).  
197
J. R. Spencer summed up the impact of Corpus Juris in this way: 
If nothing ever come of it, the Corpus Juris project is still of interest.  It 
demonstrates that the different traditions of criminal procedure in Europe 
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reform efforts in Europe and elsewhere; whether it stands as an example to others; or whether it 
is in part the product or beneficiary of such efforts, but Corpus Juris clearly is a part of a 
movement to re-think how criminal justice systems function. 
 C.  The International Criminal Tribunals 
 Following the work of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals at the end of World War II, no 
international body for the prosecution and trial of “war crimes” or other international criminal 
conduct existed until the creation in 1993 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).198  A year later, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) 
                                                                                                                                                             
are close enough for a synthesis to be attempted: and this is so whether (as 
some believe) the broad future of law of Europe in all fields is to coalesce 
in a new ius commune, or whether (as others believe) the underlying 
cultural differences are really so strong that this will never happen. 
MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY & J. R. SPENCER, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 
64-65 (2002). 
198
See LINDA CARTER, CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY & PETER HENNING, 
GLOBAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL LAW 15, 111 (2007); ELLEN PODGOR & ROGER 
CLARK, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 205 (2d. ed. 2008).  The 
full name of the tribunal, used by almost no one, is the “International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.” 
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joined the ICTY as a special tribunal to address the genocide in Rwanda.
199
  Other ad hoc 
tribunals have been established more recently to deal with special situations of violation of 
international norms.
200
   
 The procedural lineage of these courts can be traced to the World War II tribunals in their  
employment of a “mixed” or “hybrid” process, borrowing liberally from the two main legal 
traditions, but with certain features tailored to meet the peculiar needs created by the cases they 
try.  Rather than catalog and compare those procedures, it suffices to consider one example from 
the ad hoc tribunals - the ICTY - as well as the first permanent international criminal tribunal, 
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 
 i.  The ICTY 
 An observer
201
 at a trial before the ICTY would notice immediately the combination of 
disparate elements that a traditionalist might consider incompatible.  Typically, three judges sit 
collegially.
202
  The panel is selected from the “permanent” judges203 and temporary ad litem 
                                                 
199
See id. 
200
See PODGOR & CLARK, supra note ___ at Ch. 16. 
201
Observing the trial work of the ICTY is very easy, due to the video feeds of the 
courtrooms available on-line at the tribunal‟s excellent website.  See http://www.icty.org/.  
Within the past year, a virtual tour of the courtroom has been added to the site, displaying the 
arrangement of the room. 
202
See Election Process at http://www.icty.org/sid/143. 
203“Permanent” judges are elected for four-year terms, but may be re-elected.  See 
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judges appointed for a term of years; all are professionals nominated by their countries and 
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
204
  There is no lay participation in the 
judging, either by an independent jury or by use of lay judges. 
 The judges are free to ask witnesses questions, but the production of witness evidence 
ordinarily takes the form of direct and cross-examination by the prosecuting and defending 
counsel.
205
  Rule 85 of the ICTY‟s Rules of Procedure and Evidence specifies that “each party is 
entitled to call witnesses and present evidence.”206  Defendants choose whether to testify, and 
opening statements and closing arguments are permitted.
207
  Witnesses are placed under oath, 
and their testimony is given in open court unless the interests of justice, security, or “public order 
                                                                                                                                                             
Election Process at http://www.icty.org/sid/143. 
204
See Election Process at http://www.icty.org/sid/143. 
205
See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 85(B), IT/32/Rev.43 (24 July 2009): 
“Examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination shall be allowed in each case.  It 
shall be for the party calling a witness to examine such witness in chief, but a Judge may at any 
stage put any question to the witness.” See also CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 218-19 (2001) (judges are not exclusively 
responsible for presentation of evidence but have an ancillary responsibility to question). 
206
See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 85(A), IT/32/Rev.43 (24 July 2009). 
207
See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 84, 84 bis, 85(B), IT/32/Rev.43 (24 July 
2009). 
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or morality” dictate otherwise.208 
 Rules of evidence not unfamiliar to an American trial lawyer are in place, although  
hearsay evidence and other forms of evidence considered insufficiently reliable for a jury may be 
considered and given an appropriate weight.
209
  Even an exclusionary rule exists, albeit one cast 
in the vague generalities typical of European “exclusionary rules.”210 The burden is on the 
prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but a simple majority of the trial judges 
may convict.
211
  
 Apart from the absence of a jury and the somewhat more active participation of the trial 
judges, an ICTY proceeding is not jarringly dissimilar to the adversarial trial of an American or 
British court.  It does have, however, a distinctively non-adversarial, continental flavor that is 
even more evident in practice than in the rules of form.  For example, the panels of judges (“trial 
chambers”) may include judges from English-speaking, adversarial traditions, sitting alongside 
colleagues from civil law, nonadversarial countries.  Although each judge on these mixed panels 
will follow the letter of the procedural rules, each one is likely to approach judging in a 
                                                 
208
See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 79, IT/32/Rev.43 (24 July 2009). 
209
See generally Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Sec. 3, IT/32/Rev.43 (24 July 2009). 
210
See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 95, IT/32/Rev.43 (24 July 2009): “No 
evidence shall be admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability 
or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the 
proceedings.” 
211
See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 87(A), IT/32/Rev.43 (24 July 2009). 
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noticeably different way.  A German judge, for instance, would be more likely to question 
witnesses actively and exercise more control over the proceedings, while a Scottish judge might 
be content to sit quietly and let the lawyers direct the flow of evidence.  Panels in which judges 
of one tradition dominate may handle the proceedings very differently than those of another 
tradition, even though the evidence and the lawyers are the same.  A strong presiding judge can 
influence the tone of the trial, and even rule on evidentiary and procedural matters in ways that 
reflect his or her own legal background. 
 While trial proceedings are mostly open and oral, the nature of the crimes being tried 
often requires that they be closed to the public.  This might be done to protect a witness from 
coercion or retaliation, or because testimony is considered especially sensitive or embarrassing 
or revealing of confidential matters.  Closing parts of the trials to the public serves important 
interests, but it runs counter to the legal training and experience of judges from countries with 
strong free speech/open trial cultures.
212
  An English judge could view other interests as 
prevailing over the need for transparency and public discussion of the trial,
213
 while an American 
judge would defer more readily and expansively to the need for justice done publicly.  These 
differences threaten the goal of consistency within a multinational tribunal.  Consequently, trials 
                                                 
212
For a general discussion of open trials and the relationship between the media and the 
justice process in Europe, see Marcel Lemonde, Justice and the Media, EUROPEAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 688-715 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J. R. Spencer, 2002). 
213
See Marcel Lemonde, Justice and the Media, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURES 692-97 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J. R. Spencer, 2002). 
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conducted in the same “legal language” will nevertheless have distinctive “accents” depending 
on the composition of the chamber. 
 Another danger of multinational (or multi-traditional) judging is the tendency to 
somewhat haphazard rule interpretation at the trial level.  No procedure code is watertight; all 
have gaps that must be filled by interpretive rule-making in the court of first instance.  This “law 
in the interstices” is even more likely to reflect the learned biases of the judges.  At the extreme, 
this can produce sufficiently disparate results that lawyers, defendants, and observers of the court 
sense the tribunal is “making it up as it goes along.”214  These inconsistencies can be corrected 
roughly and for the most part at the appeals level, but the appearance of courts within the same 
tribunal handling trial issues in different ways potentially undermines the confidence of the 
litigants and the public. 
 Setting aside the advantages and challenges of combining judges, the ICTY demonstrates 
the first significant combination of procedural rules from different traditions.  The three-judge 
trial bench, functioning without the possibility of lay participation, starkly contrasts, not only 
with the independent jury model of the United States and Great Britain, but also with the mixed-
bench model of many western European countries.  To the extent that the judges exercise control 
and question witnesses, the trial differs further from a strong adversarial model. 
                                                 
214
In fact, the permanent judges of the ICTY create the procedural rules and evidence 
rules.  See ELLEN PODGOR & ROGER CLARK, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW, Sec. 16.04, at 212-13 (2d ed. 2008).  So, in a sense, the judges of the tribunal 
do “make up” the law of the court. 
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 On the other hand, there is considerable adversariness in the ICTY‟s trial procedures.  
Lawyers bear the primary responsibility for calling witnesses and examining them under rules of 
evidence that are more extensive than necessary in most non-adversarial systems.  Motions are 
made by the lawyers; they argue their cases and control the order of evidence; and the burden of 
proof falls on the prosecution and is identical to that used in England and the United States.   
 Notwithstanding the hybridization of procedural rules by the ICTY, it seems quite 
successful in its role as a neutral, fair arbiter of conduct in a regional conflict.
215
  The use of 
video streaming via its website, simultaneous translation into the official languages of the 
tribunal, published rules of procedure and evidence, and professional, competent prosecution and 
judging - complete with detailed “European-style” judgments - contribute to the claim that the 
ICTY has achieved important goals that extend beyond accountability for crimes against 
humanity.
216
 
                                                 
215
This view, obviously, will never be shared by all.  See Eric A. Posner, POLITICAL 
TRIALS IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 55 Duke L.J. 75, 149 (2005) (“In the 
international setting, international criminal tribunals will similarly look like efforts by the 
governments that influence the prosecutor and judges-- whether the Security Council (in ad hoc 
cases) or the members of the ICC--to harass or embarrass states with contrary foreign policy 
objectives. The states whose nationals are being tried will always make this charge, however 
faithfully the prosecutor and judges try to carry out their duties”). 
216
See ELLEN PODGOR & ROGER CLARK, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW, Sec. 16.04, at 214 (2d ed. 2008); Bringing Justice to the Former Yugoslavia, 
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 ii.  The ICC
217
 
 In important respects, the ICTY has laid the groundwork for the ICC, the first permanent 
international criminal court.
218
  The ICTY experience includes many of the same issues and 
complications that can be expected as the ICC begins its work: political wrangling;
219
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Tribunal’s Five Core Achievements, available at 
http://ulm.katholikentag.de/data/kt_aktuell/manuskripte/3732.doc (outlining “five core 
achievements” of ICTY).   
217
Because this article considers the procedural trends at work in the world today, I do not 
describe the creation of the ICC, its purpose - except in the most general terms - or the 
substantive crimes subject to prosecution by the court.  I also have focused for purpose of 
comparison on the procedures involved in the trial of cases, rather than in their investigation and 
appeal.  The history of the negotiation of the Rome Statute and the continuing efforts to shape 
this tribunal in its formative stages are most interesting, but are outside the scope of this article. 
218See Bringing Justice to the Former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal’s Five Core 
Achievements, available at http://ulm.katholikentag.de/data/kt_aktuell/manuskripte/3732.doc at 8 
(expertise developed by ICTY has been shared with those involved with the ICC and Special 
Court for Sierra Leone). 
219Professor Broomhall notes that, “The experience of the ad hoc tribunals has only 
underscored the interplay between law and politics in the enforcement of international criminal 
law.”  BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE & THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 154 (2003). 
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cooperation - or lack thereof - among the affected states and with the court;
220
 development of a 
body of “common law” and interpretation from very general international standards;221 and, of 
course, creation of procedural rules that seek to accommodate a variety of differing notions of 
due process.   
 Because the ICC was created through a treaty process, substantive rules of law and rules 
of procedure and evidence were part of the founding document (the “Rome Statute”).222  To 
supplement the provisions of the Rome Statute, separate rules of procedure and evidence have 
been adopted by the parties to the treaty.
223
  These rules augment and expand upon the more 
                                                 
220
BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE & THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 152-55 (2003) (ICTY foreshadows experience that awaits ICC, states‟ 
cooperation with ICTY has been uneven). 
221
See BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE & THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 162 (2003) (ICC undoubtedly will contribute to 
formal rule of law in international criminal law). 
222
The Rome Statute, creating the International Criminal Court, was adopted in 1998 and 
entered into force on July 1, 2002 after being ratified by 60 countries.  See About the Court, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About%20the%20Court/. 
223
See R. PROC. & EVID., ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rules+of+Procedure+and+Evidenc
e.htm. 
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general articles of the Rome Statute.
224
 
 As with the ICTY, the ICC‟s composition and processes reflect the influences of its 
members.
225
  While in some respects the ICC differs procedurally from the ICTY, there are many 
similarities.  Here again, three judges of the “Trial Division” of the ICC sit as the “Trial 
Chamber” to hear cases.226  They conduct the proceedings in such a way as to “ensure that a trial 
is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due 
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.”227  The court‟s role in simultaneously 
conducting a criminal trial, and protecting, and sometimes compensating, crime victims
228
 is one 
                                                 
224
See R. PROC. & EVID., ICC-ASP/1/3, explanatory note (2002), available at 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rules+of+Procedure+and+Evidenc
e.htm. 
225
Although the United States is not a party to the treaty, its role in forming the court 
through negotiations leading to the Rome Statute, and following its adoption, is a considerable 
one.  For more information on the troubled relationship between the United States and its 
negotiating partners, and the influence these debates had on policy, see BRUCE BROOMHALL, 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE & THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 163-83 (2003)  
226
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 39(2)(b)(ii). 
227
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 64(2). 
228
Restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation of victims may be ordered by the trial 
chamber, even if the victims have not requested the remedy.  See Rome Statute of the 
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more often seen in European legal systems than in that of the United States.  Given the nature of 
the offenses prosecuted in the ICC (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes 
of aggression), it perhaps is not surprising that special provision was made for victims. 
 Ordinarily, trials are held at The Hague, the seat of the ICC.
229
  The trial is public unless 
necessity dictates closing it,
230
 and a record of the proceedings is made.
231
  Provision is made for 
a voluntary admission of guilt by the accused,
232
 raising the possibility of plea bargaining.  The 
Statute makes clear, however, that “any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence 
regarding modification of the charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall 
not be binding on the Court.”233  While this language establishes that the court, and not the 
parties, bears responsibility for determining guilt and setting the punishment, it does not preclude 
plea negotiation.
234
   
 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required for a conviction, and the presumption of 
                                                                                                                                                             
International Criminal Court, Art. 75.  
229
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 62. 
230
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 64(7). 
231
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 64(10). 
232
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 65. 
233
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 65(5) 
234
The same limitation exists in the United States, a country in which most cases are 
“settled” by plea bargaining. 
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innocence is expressly established.
235
  A list of rights enjoyed by the accused is enumerated in 
Article 67.  These include the right to be informed of the nature of the charge;
236
 to obtain the 
advice of counsel and prepare a defense;
237
 to a speedy trial;
238
 to be present and have counsel 
appointed if the defendant is indigent;
239
 to examine and cross-examine witnesses and compel 
attendance;
240
 and to have an appointed interpreter, if needed.
241
  The accused also has the right 
not to testify, and not to have an inference of guilt drawn from the invocation of the right to 
silence;
242
 and to make an unsworn statement in his or her defense.
243
  Mitigating or exculpatory 
evidence in the possession of the prosecutor must be disclosed to the defendant.
244
 
 Witnesses must “give an undertaking as to the truthfulness” of their testimony,245 and 
                                                 
235
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 66. 
236
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(1)(a). 
237
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(1)(b). 
238
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(1)(c). 
239
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(1)(d). 
240
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(1)(e). 
241
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(1)(f). 
242
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(1)(g). 
243
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(1)(h). 
244
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 67(2). 
245
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 69(1). 
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generally are required to testify in person.
246
  It is the parties who submit evidence,
247
 and the 
judges who rule on its admissibility.
248
  Rules of privilege and judicial notice exist,
249
 and a kind 
of exclusionary rule forbids admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Rome Statute or 
“internationally recognized human rights,” but only if the violation makes the evidence less 
reliable or “the admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage 
the integrity of the proceedings.”250 
 This elaboration of rights bears marked similarity to the guarantees found in an American 
or British adversarial trial, but would also be familiar to practitioners in a Continental 
nonadversarial system.  Inclusion of the parties‟ right to examine and cross-examine witnesses, 
and to present relevant evidence and make closing statements,
251
 invests the process with an 
adversarial flavor.  As with the ICTY, however, control of the proceedings by a three-judge 
panel, and without the participation of lay jurors or judges, provides a bit of comfort for those 
who find the prospect of judging by “regular” people to be reckless.  ICC judges also have the 
                                                 
246
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 69(2). 
247
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 69(3). 
248
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 69(4). 
249
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 69(5), (6). 
250
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 69(7). 
251
See R. PROC. & EVID., ICC-ASP/1/3, R.142 (2002), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rules+of+Procedure+and+Evidenc
e.htm. 
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right to examine witnesses,
252
 and an active trial chamber could change the feel of the process 
considerably in the direction of an “inquisitorial” one.253   
 While the application of these rules may trend in either direction, it seems likely that the 
ICC trial experience will be a kind of hybridized process reminiscent of the ICTY.  Even if this 
occurs, though, the ICC occupies a unique position within worldwide criminal procedure.  It is a 
permanent body, and therefore unlike the ICTY, ICTR, Nuremberg tribunal, or any of the other 
ad hoc courts.  While it shares its supranational character with the United Nations, it stands 
separate and apart from the U.N.  Within the bounds of the express authority conferred on it by 
the Rome Statute and the indulgence of its member states, the ICC enjoys a rare freedom to 
develop its own procedural jurisprudence and custom.  As the most visible institution of its kind, 
independent from the dictates of any particular nation, legal tradition or culture, the ICC 
constitutes an on-going experiment.  As such, it may prompt nations considering procedural 
reforms to follow its example.  The more fundamental question, however, is whether the ICC is 
itself merely a reflection of a much broader reform movement. 
                                                 
252
See R. PROC. & EVID., ICC-ASP/1/3, R. 140(2)(c) (2002), available at 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rules+of+Procedure+and+Evidenc
e.htm. 
253
See CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 220 (2001) (judges are more than passive “umpires” and closer to those of 
Continental systems). 
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VI.  WHY IS THIS HAPPENING? 
 All of these modifications of criminal procedure might be entirely unconnected and 
coincidental, but if they are, it is surprising that such different legal traditions have adopted  so 
many common features.  Instead, this movement may reflect a growing consensus about the 
desirability of certain procedural processes, or disenchantment with others, or both.  Or, it may 
be prompted by the examples of the ad hoc tribunals
254
 and those nations that engaged in reform 
efforts relatively early. If the convergence is deliberate, is it motivated by a new unified view of 
what criminal procedure should be?  If so, where did that unified view originate, and what is it?  
Is this convergent trend likely to continue; to change direction; or to end?   
 Given the connectedness of the economies, peoples, and political leadership of developed 
nations, it is impossible to believe that procedural changes begin and grow in a vacuum.  As the 
strong walls of legal sovereignty, which had been left relatively intact by the world community, 
crumbled with the creation of the World War II tribunals and the United Nations, invading 
notions of “international norms” gained stronger footing in countries that previously had paid 
little heed outside of diplomatic circles to what other nations were doing.  Whether the exchange 
of social and popular culture through television, instant news, increased travel, or trade prompted 
the spread of legal culture or merely expedited it, the impact of globalization must have played a 
                                                 
254
See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O‟SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 137 (2010) (decisions of 
supranational criminal courts “provide a growing source of analysis and guidance from which a 
universal code of criminal procedure may one day emerge”). 
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significant part in propagating reform.
255
 
 Some have argued against the establishment of a universal system of criminal 
procedure,
256
 while others have promoted the idea.
257
  Richard Vogler describes his opposition: 
The first principle I would like to propose is the abandonment of the impractical 
dream of discovering the universal laws of motion of criminal procedure through 
the application of scientific method.  This project, still very much alive in the 
conferences of the Association Internationale de Droit Pénale (AIDP), is linked to 
a Positivist agenda which has long been discredited in most disciplines.  It 
                                                 
255
See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O‟SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, 
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 136 (2010) (“one result of an 
increasingly interconnected world ... is a clear trend toward harmonization, if not actual 
convergence, among the various legal systems around the world”); L. Mullenix, American 
Exceptionalism and Convergence Theory: Are We There Yet?, Papers of the International 
Association of Procedural Law, 2009 Toronto Conference 15 (2009); S. Baumgartner, Civil 
Procedure Reform in Switzerland and the Role of Legal Transplants, Papers of the International 
Association of Procedural Law, 2009 Toronto Conference 43 (2009) (“there is bound to be some 
convergence of rules and approaches across legal cultures as various forms of international 
interaction increase”). 
256
See RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 277 (2005). 
257
See, e.g., CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2001). 
  89 
represents a yearning for the creation of a universal code of criminal procedure 
which could be applicable across the globe and which would enable us all to 
coordinate our efforts in the collective defence against crime.  This ambition, 
which was central to the early scientific endeavours of comparative criminal 
justice, is still exercising its powerful fascination, most notably in the elegant and 
thoughtful work of Delmas-Marty (2003). 
 It has encouraged the creation of pan-European projects at the level of 
criminal justice, such as Corpus Iuris, Eurojust and the office of the European 
Prosecutor.  It has developed a new impetus from the foundation of the 
international tribunals which has renewed enthusiasm for the elaboration of a 
truly universal procedure.
258
 
 It may well be that a universal approach to criminal procedure is a Utopian dream we are 
incapable of achieving, and one that is not, in any case, desirable.  The mere existence of region-
wide efforts like Corpus Juris, as Vogler says, reflects the “yearning” for universality, but 
success or failure in the implementation of these smaller-scale projects will portend the future of 
broader ambitions.  Assuming that historical, cultural, and political obstacles prove too great to 
overcome in realizing a completely unified procedure, striving for that goal may nevertheless 
reveal workable combinations previously considered incompatible.
259
  If one or several hybrid, 
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See RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 277 (2005). 
259
Cf. L. Mullenix, American Exceptionalism and Convergence Theory: Are We There 
Yet?, Papers of the International Association of Procedural Law, 2009 Toronto Conference 15 
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adversarial/non-adversarial constructs are seen to succeed in practice, that success will encourage 
further experimentation and foster a greater willingness to consider new procedural schemes.  
Partial success, as in the Italian reforms, will discourage some, encourage others, and cause still 
more to proceed cautiously. 
 The ad hoc tribunals, especially the ICTY and ICTR, were a brave attempt to fashion a 
compromise procedure that would be essentially adversarial, but with sufficient vestiges of a 
non-adversarial approach to allow participation and acceptance by judges, defendants, victims, 
and attorneys from those traditions.  Despite the attractiveness of the adversarial model, or 
perhaps because the model was championed by advisers and advocates in the English-speaking 
world, modifications have been necessary to curb the abuses so prominently on display in the 
trial of Slobodan Milosevic, a spectacle that lasted four years and was incomplete at the time of  
his death.
260
  Creation of a procedural regime without lay judging and including the possibility of 
pleading guilty may have promised increased efficiency, but it was a promise unfulfilled.  ICTY 
trials have been lengthy, due in part to the unfamiliarity of civil law judges with the practical 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2009) (convergence of American common law and civil law systems may occur despite 
“peculiarly American resistance to theoretical concepts or foreign norms” and because of “the 
U.S.‟s ready embrace of pragmatism and practical solutions”). 
260
See Slobodan Milosevic, 64, Former Yugoslav Leader Accused of War Crimes, Dies, 
The New York Times (March 12, 2006), 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/m/slobodan_milosevic/index.html; 
RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 282-83 (2005).  
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workings of adversarial rules,
261
 but also due to inherent inefficiencies in such a system of 
adjudication.  Political considerations and a certain lack of cooperation by affected states also 
have contributed to the slowness of the process.
262
  These influences are unlikely to be present in 
the reformed systems of individual nations, although other obstacles to efficiency undoubtedly 
will remain.  In the context of the ad hoc tribunals, the inefficiencies of the adversarial model 
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See RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 281 (2005) 
(ICTY trials typically last for a year).  No doubt, the nature of the crimes being tried in the ICTY 
hindered efforts at speedy prosecution.  Much of the oral testimony must be translated, and while 
this is done simultaneously, corrections sometimes must be made and clarifications sought, all of 
which contributes to delay.  Much of the testimony revolves around persons and events 
considerably removed in time from the actual trial, and that evidence is obscured by the 
unavailability of records and witnesses, in addition to the loss of detailed memory.  Events under 
discussion occurred in a distant part of Europe, making it time-consuming to obtain any 
supplementary materials or witnesses. To the extent that witnesses are reluctant, due to fear of 
retribution or security concerns, the usual flow of testimony may be difficult to achieve or 
sustain.  Lawyers unskilled in direct and cross-examination experience more difficulty eliciting 
testimony.  All of these factors slow the adversarial trial process, a process that is inherently 
cumbersome and inefficient. 
262
See RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 280-81 
(2005). 
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gradually resulted in resort to more non-adversarial, inquisitorial modes of practice.
264
  This 
experience is mirrored in the Italian criminal procedure reforms designed to introduce an 
adversarial characteristic in a traditionally inquisitorial system.  As with the ad hoc tribunals, the 
Italians have struggled to find ways to cope with the inefficiencies of their reformed system.
265
 
 Adversarial trials are essentially an expression of preference for control by the individual 
rather than the state.
266
  Given the history of the founding of the United States, it is hardly 
surprising that the adversarial model flourished in this country.  The central government was not 
to be trusted; sturdy individualism, at first a practical necessity, became the national ideal.  
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See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 387 (2003) (need 
to speed up proceedings has been “primary rationale” for change from adversariness to more 
inquisitorial features); RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 281-
82 (2005) (various factors led to significant “drift” away from the adversarial). 
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See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 304 (C. Bradley 2d ed. 
2007) (democratic reforms made trial “more complicated and time-consuming”). 
266Richard Vogler notes, for example, that “the historic shift of European criminal justice 
towards increased due process has been a natural and continuing tendency in a democratic 
environment.”  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE 11 (R. Vogler & B. Huber eds. 2008).  
This is not to say, of course, that adversarial processes are more likely to produce “due process.”  
To the extent that they vest more control in those they seek to judge, they will present a more 
attractive alternative to justice dispensed exclusively by legal professionals and representatives 
of the government. 
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Movement among legal systems toward an adversarial view of adjudication may be a reflection 
of the growth of individualism in other countries, or a concurrent disillusionment with 
government-controlled systems regarded as inherently corrupt and suspect.  If so, the continuing 
attractiveness of adversarial procedures
267
 is assured among countries in which strong 
government control at the expense of the individual exists, and reform is likely to be accelerated 
by dissatisfaction with social or economic conditions attributable to the political leadership or 
form of government.  
 One may wonder why this impulse for a more active role in the criminal justice system 
has not been widespread in the past.  The answer lies in the vastly increased access to 
information that only recently has been available.  Not so long ago, the legal doings of other 
nations were known primarily to the “knowledgeable elite” of societies, and not to the ordinary 
citizens or even to most lawyers and judges.  American popular culture, complete with its images 
of trials in which juries decide cases presented by lawyers working for their clients instead of 
collaboratively, has spread ever more widely as Hollywood continues its love affair with the 
exaggerated drama of the American courtroom.  The average American probably has never seen 
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The adversarial model continues to dominate the reform movement.  See CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN EUROPE 11 (R. Vogler & B. Huber eds. 2008) (adversarial methodology has 
dominated ideologically during the last decades of the 20
th
 century and the first years of the 
present century).  According to Richard Vogler, in continental Europe, the “drive towards 
adversariality” has been “remorseless.”  See id. at 12.  He notes that it also has spread through 
diverse regions of the world.  Id. 
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a foreign film or television program - even with the advent of satellite channels - that depicts an 
inquisitorial criminal trial.  If an American does see a foreign trial, it is likely to be in a British 
film in which wigged and robed advocates with accents play out a trial procedure already 
familiar to the viewer.  People in non-English-speaking countries, however, have no trouble 
finding depictions of the adversarial trial, or at least a romanticized version of it.
268
  Precisely 
because it is a romanticized version, neatly concluded in 50 minutes or less and in which justice 
virtually always is done even against terrible odds, foreign lawmakers may be excused for 
turning to that model for its attractive features, but without a full appreciation of its 
shortcomings. 
 For many of the same reasons, the jury system is well known and widely admired.  
Would the average citizen prefer to be judged by a professional judge who is a political 
appointee or government civil servant, or by a panel of like-minded citizens?  The allure of a jury 
system is only enhanced by the opportunity it presents to participate in some significant way in 
important decision-making.  The jury is a democratic institution precisely because it gives 
Everyman a temporary role in the application of criminal justice; it makes the juror a judge-for-
a-day. 
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When I have taught in Austria, my Austrian students always are familiar with the 
American style trial through television and movies.  Most of them, though, have never seen an 
Austrian criminal trial and have only a vague idea how it would look. I find it ironic that an 
American law professor would have viewed more Austrian criminal trials than a law student 
from that country.   
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 Whatever its genesis, the movement toward increased use of adversarial processes - and 
perhaps any significant movement - faces roadblocks that will be very difficult to overcome in 
the short term, and may prove insurmountable.  As noted, the inefficiencies inherent in the 
system, the indirect and counter-intuitive method of searching for the truth involved in a 
cumbersome direct- and cross-examination system; the seeming relegation of truth-finding to 
secondary importance, and the need for complex evidentiary rules to protect juries from undue 
prejudice and unreliable evidence, all become apparent only after adversarial procedures are 
adopted.  Whether the challenges of operating under an adversarial model outweigh the benefits 
of giving the affected parties a measure of control remains to be seen, and that cost/benefit 
analysis undoubtedly will produce variations in systems trying to adjust to a new method of 
adjudication, including total abandonment of the effort in some countries.
269
 
 As a result of these experiments shifting toward adversariness, a kind of composite 
hybrid model has emerged.  It bears distinctive inquisitorial aspects: a pre-trial investigative 
phase conducted by a separate magistrate or prosecutor supervised by an investigating 
magistrate; an emphasis on truth-finding, including broad disclosure or discovery measures; a 
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See RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 283 (2005) 
(“radical strengthening” of inquisitorial features of ICTY proposed in wake of Milosevic 
prosecution).  Some adjustments of balance were made by the ICC, based on the experience of 
the ICTY and ICTR.  Essentially an adversarial trial procedure, the ICC model includes 
compensating inquisitorial features.  See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 387 (2003).   
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significant degree of participation by the trial judge, but with deference to the parties‟ rights to 
direct the proceedings; some reliance on written forms of evidence, with more pre-trial 
disclosure to the judge of evidence to be used at trial; and expansive review powers by appellate 
courts.
270
  Exclusionary rules may exist, but are subsidiary to the truth-finding function.  The 
lawyers‟ primary responsibility is to serve the ends of justice, rather than trying to “win” an 
adversarial contest on behalf of their clients. 
 The composite sketch also would contain adversarial elements not previously included in 
the inquisitorial model.  Most visible is the significant control the parties exercise over the trial, 
including introduction of evidence by direct- and cross-examination of witnesses they choose.  
Increasingly, but not in the international tribunals,
271
 lay judges are being installed, sometimes 
even independent, British-style juries, a distinctly democratizing reform measure.  In an effort to 
expedite the movement of cases through courts, various forms of summary disposition, including 
plea bargaining, are allowed.
272
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See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 386-87 
(2003); RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 282-83 (2005) 
(adoption of inquisitorial procedures by ICTY). 
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See CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 216 (2001) (use of jury in an international criminal court is “entirely out of the 
question”). 
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This necessary component of adversarial procedures will prove especially unattractive 
to many.  Richard Vogler explains: 
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 Is it possible, or desirable, to seek to develop from this hybrid composite model a 
                                                                                                                                                             
  
 
One of 
the 
most 
persist
ent 
critiqu
es of 
the 
introdu
ction 
of 
more   
adversariality is that the emphasis on the trial encourages compensatory moves 
towards the use of the guilty plea, plea bargaining and an expedited pre-trial, in 
which outcomes are achieved by negotiation between the parties rather than by 
hearing in open court.   
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE 14 (R. Vogler & B. Huber eds. 2008).  
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universal method of criminal investigation and adjudication?
273
  Clearly, there are great 
advantages to be gained in achieving uniformity in crime control measures.  And to a 
considerable degree, the intertwining of cultures in the Information Age homogenizes popular 
national understandings and expectations of what a justice system should be.  However attractive 
it may be, the implementation of a uniform system invariably meets the reality that has been 
experienced in Italy and by the ICTY and ICTR, and can be expected in the ICC.
274
  Imagine 
how much more pronounced that challenge must be when individual, sovereign states, e.g., 
China, attempt to align with a world model not of their making, and ill-suited to their national 
legal ethos.   
 English is the current lingua franca, but there is no widespread movement to replace 
local languages.  The Euro has become a regional currency, but even within the EU, some 
members cling to their traditional bills and coins.  Most of the world uses metric measurements, 
but the United States and others stubbornly refuse to cede the foot, yard, pound, and gallon.  
Adoption of a universal language, currency, and system of measurement also would facilitate 
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Christoph Safferling believes such a universal procedure is possible and can be derived 
from widely accepted human rights norms.  See CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2001).  His proposed construct bears a marked 
resemblance to that adopted by the ICTY and ICC.  See id. at 366-79. 
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 That same reality may explain why the United States did not embrace the tenets and 
processes it created with the Nuremberg tribunals, but other nations did.  See Leila Nadya Sadat, 
The Nuremberg Paradox, LVIII AM. J. COMP. L. 151 (2010) (arguing that the French readily 
accepted the “internationalization” of criminal law due to its compatibility with their legal 
tradition, while the U.S. did not follow its own example because it was inconsistent American 
law, legal philosophy, and politics). 
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trade and travel, but the costs in national pride, tradition, and political capital still outweigh these 
benefits.  In the same way, nations may adopt some reforms in imitation of the Italians
275
 or the 
international tribunals, but will not, and should not, insist on a truly uniform, universal method of 
investigation and adjudication.
276
  To the extent that developed countries are reform-minded, 
they seem to be considering - and often selecting from - the adversarial hybrid menu that 
currently is in vogue.  But their selections vary considerably, as does the success they achieve in 
integrating the chosen reforms into their own firmly entrenched systems.
277
  If China, Argentina, 
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The Italian reforms have served as an example for the rest of Europe.  See CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE IN EUROPE 13 (R. Vogler & B. Huber eds. 2008) (Italian reforms “watched 
with the greatest interest by the rest of the continent). 
276
Contra see CHRISTOPH SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 378-79 (2001): 
False adherence to domestic legal cultures that emerged for certain political and 
historical reasons helps no one.  Instead there must be a profound rethinking of 
domestic legal systems with a look at the necessities of such a young and sensitive 
legal order as international criminal law.  Certainly a case-to-case development as 
attempted by the ICTY can be considered inevitable.  Nevertheless, in order to 
avoid embarrassment of states and individuals, this must take place within a solid 
theoretical consensus. 
277
Richard Vogler noted the same limitations while arguing that universality is a notion 
based on false positivist premises: 
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and Italy prefer adversarial procedures, they certainly will not take the same form, or be 
embraced with the same enthusiasm in each of those countries.  
 Reform is not doomed to failure.  An increased measure of consensus on principles can 
be achieved, but as the Italian and ICTY examples have shown, real and practical reform 
requires patience and persistence, and a willingness to adjust the reform measures when time and 
experience reveal incompatibilities.  Important benefits can be realized in the effort to find 
common ground, but that good must not be sacrificed in the quest for the perfect.  
Transplantation is a tricky business in law, as in other human organs.   
                                                                                                                                                             
[W]hilst the new international regimes of criminal justice are to be welcomed and 
whilst the underlying traditions of criminal justice are truly universal, it remains a 
matter for each nation to develop its own particular regime in accordance with 
local traditions and bearing in mind the guiding principles of procedure. 
RICHARD VOGLER, A WORLD VIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 285 (2005).  
